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Due to length and time constraints, this dissertation will briefly examine and provide an 
overview  of  the current method that courts have adopted in bringing a class action in Southern 
Africa and internationally. Specific focus will be on the Unites States of America, Australia and 
the Canadian province of Ontario.  Challenges of bringing a class action will also be discussed, 
with a view of ascertaining the most appropriate or well-suited method of bringing a class action 
under the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008. The main issue that will be analysed will be the 
certification process. The key question to be answered is which approach or procedure, in 
dealing with the certification requirements under various jurisdictions, should South Africa adopt 
or incorporate into, class action procedure legislation? In chapter one I will introduce the concept 
of a class action as it is a relatively new concept found in South African consumer legislation. 
Different definitions of a class action will be discussed in context of particular statutes. I will 
define and highlight the purposes of a class action in South Africa and show why there is firstly, 
a need for such a procedure and secondly why there is a need for such procedure to be codified 
into legislation. In chapter two I will discuss certain important aspects of class actions. The 
purpose of this is to identify the main features of a class action. Ultimately, the purpose will be to 
discuss whether or not these features should be included in South African class actions. Chapter 
three will commence with the comparative perspective portion of this paper. The legislation 
adopted by the United States, will be discussed in chapter three followed by a discussion of the 
Ontario legislation in chapter four and the Australian legislation in chapter 5. The approaches 
that these jurisdictions have taken in respect of a class action procedure serve as a basis upon 
which a class action procedure for South Africa will be recommended. Chapter six will provide 
conclusions that have been drawn through analysis of the foreign jurisdictions’ class action 
procedures which will reflect the best and worst elements of a class action procedure. This is 
significant in determining what type of class action procedure would be best suited to South 
Africa. Chapter seven will highlight the current South African approach to class actions through 
an examination of case law and a Report by the South African Law Commission. This chapter 
will also analyse the short-comings in the South African approach through a critique of case law. 
In chapter eight of this paper I will propose an approach that South Africa should adopt with 
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regard to a class action procedure that is best suited to South Africa’s social climate. Finally, I 
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On 22 January 2013, under Californian law, a consumer protection class action was launched 
against world renowned cyclist Lance Armstrong and his publishers. The action arose from the 
allegations that the publishers of Armstrong’s books knew or should have known that these 
books were works of fiction and therefore their action in the selling these books as works of non-
fiction, constituted a misrepresentation.1 Such actions are virtually unknown in South Africa but 
due to recent developments in the law, it is not inconceivable that a similar type class action 
could be launched in South Africa. 
According to De Vos a class action is defined as follows: 
“A class action … is a [procedure] that enables a large group of people, whose rights have been 
similarly infringed by a wrongdoer, to sue the defendant as a collective entity. One member (or 
more members) of a group, which does not have to form an organisational unit, initiates the 
action as a representative party on behalf of a whole group, without the need to join all the 
members. If the court is satisfied that certain requirements have been met, inter alia, that the 
plaintiff will represent the interests of the absent members of the class adequately, it may grant 
leave for the action to proceed as a class action. And the order of the court at the end of the 
proceedings is not only for the benefit of all members of the group, but it also binds all of them.”2 
 
South Africa has been slow to develop the notion of class actions.  This notion was initially 
introduced in section 7(a)(b) of the Interim Constitution of 1993,3 and then included permanently 
                                                          
1 Rob Stutzman, Jonathan Wheeler, Gloria Lauria, David Reimers and Scott Armstrong, on behalf of themselves and 
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Lance ARMSTRONG; Penguin Group (USA), Inc.; G.P. Putnam's Sons; 
The Berkley Publishing Group; Random House, Inc.; Broadway Books; Crown Publishing Group; Thomas W. 
Weisel; William J. Stapleton; and Does 1-50, inclusive, Defendants 2013 WL 1178749 (E.D.Cal., Mar. 7, 2013). 
2 WLR De Vos ‘Is a class action classy to implement outside the ambit of the constitution?’ (2012) 4 Journal of 
South African Law 737, 738. 
3 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Interim Constitution’). 
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in section 38(c) of the Final Constitution of 1996.4 However, this class action procedure is 
restricted to when a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened.5 
Although section 157 of the Companies Act6 also makes provision for individuals to form a 
group or class and to then apply their collective powers to access redress for an infringement of 
their rights, it was not until the enactment of the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 20087 – South 
Africa’s first consumer protection statute – that the class action proceeding was brought out of 
the realm of constitutional rights and into the realm of consumer rights. Section 4(1) of the CPA 
provides for class actions to be brought in terms of consumer law. This section provides as 
follows: 
“Realisation of consumer rights 
4. (1) Any of the following persons may, in the manner provided for in this Act, 
approach a court, the Tribunal or the Commission alleging that a consumer’s rights in 
terms of this Act have been infringed, impaired or threatened, or that prohibited conduct 
has occurred or is occurring: 
(a) A person acting on his or her own behalf; 
(b) an authorised person acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in his 
or her own name; 
(c) a person acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of 
affected persons; 
(d) a person acting in the public interest, with leave of the Tribunal or court, as the 
case may be; and 
(e) an association acting in the interest of its members.” 
 
The substantive law regarding class actions has been laid down in various statutes. However, a 
lack of class action procedure legislation remains.  
 
                                                          
4 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Constitution’). 
5 E Hurter ‘Some thoughts on current developments relating to class actions in South African law as viewed against 
leading foreign jurisdictions’ (2006) 39 Comparative and International Law Journal of South Africa 485, 485. 
6 Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
7 Hereinafter referred to as the ‘CPA.’ 
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The recognition of a class action for consumers is an important development in consumer rights. 
In a modern society where businesses or large corporations distribute goods and services to 
consumers who are not familiar with the complexities of the production and manufacturing 
processes, there is a need to protect consumers, especially those who are uneducated and 
disadvantaged and who may encounter similar problems in respect of these products on a day-to-
day basis.8 
There is also a grave need to assist the already over-burdened judiciary in South Africa, by 
avoiding the situation where multiple parties approach the courts with multiple actions involving 
the same issues.9 This is time consuming and costly for both consumers and the courts and can 
result in inconsistent judgments being handed down. 
As necessary as a class action procedure may be in modern times, forming a class action is 
expensive for an attorney as huge infrastructure is required. Nevertheless, South African law has 
made provision for the introduction of a class action and it can be assumed that such an action is 
acceptable in certain circumstances.  
However, although the CPA makes provision for a class action it does not provide a procedure 
for bringing such an action. In cases where the courts have been faced with class action 
proceedings in matters involving the Bill of Rights and matters that fall outside the Bill’s scope 
of application, judges have relied on the South African Law Commission Report on the 
Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest Actions in South Africa10 to guide them 
through such proceedings.11 These guidelines define a class action as: 
 
                                                          
8 Hurter (note 5 above) 486. 
9 WLR De Vos ‘Reflections on the introduction of a class action in South Africa’ (1996) 4 Journal of South African 
Law 639, 640-641. 
10South African Law Commission Report 88 The recognition of class actions and public interest actions in South 
African law 1998, 33 (hereinafter referred to as ‘SA Law Commission Report’). 
11 Permanent Secretary, Department Of Welfare, Eastern Cape, and another v Ngxuza and others 2001 (4) SA;  
1184 (SCA);  Mukaddam v Pioneer Food (49/12) [2012] ZASCA 183 (29 November 2012); Mukaddam v Pioneer 
Foods (Pty) Ltd and others (CCT 131/12) [2013] ZACC 23 (27 June 2013); The Trustees for the Time Being for the 
Children's Resource Centre Trust and others v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd and others case no: 25302/10 (C); 
Children’s Resource Centre Trust v Pioneer Food (50/2012) [2012] ZASCA 182 (29 November 2012). 
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“an action instituted by a representative on behalf of a class of persons in respect of whom the 
relief claimed and the issues involved are substantially similar in respect of all members of the 
class, and which action is certified as a class action in terms of the Act.”12 
 
These guidelines are not found in legislation and therefore, there is and will continue to be, a 
variation in the approach that different courts take towards class action proceedings. Judge-made 
procedural law is therefore not the best option because there is a need for uniformity, certainty 
and consistency. It is therefore submitted that a formal procedure codified into legislation is 
required. 
 
The purpose of this paper will be to analyse and discuss foreign (American, Australian and 
Canadian) and local legislation and case law in order to propose a procedure for class action 
litigation in South Africa, that can be followed by both consumers and courts in instituting  such 












                                                          




IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF A CLASS ACTION 
Two of the main features of a class action are the certification process and the form of notice. 
The requirements of a class action are considered during the certification process. There are two 
forms of notice which are commonly used under the class action regime. These are the opt in vs. 
the opt out form of notice. The notices serve to protect the rights of the absent class members 
during the class litigation.  
 
2.1 THE CERTIFICATION PROCESS 
Certification is a process in terms of which a judge is called upon to declare that a particular 
group of individuals constitute a class due to certain similarities in the claims that they wish to 
bring. The judge also considers whether a class action is the appropriate form for the lawsuit that 
is to be instituted. 
Mulheron defines certification as the vital preliminary hearing or screen which classifies an 
action as a class action and allows it to proceed as one.13 It is a process that is aimed at ensuring 
1) better management of class actions14 and 2) that only laudable cases proceed as class actions.15 
A judge is required to examine evidence in support of a class action and then either grant or deny 
the certification of the action.16 
The certification process is vital to a class action as the rights of members of a class that are not 
active in the litigation are determined  in their absence and therefore the classification of whether 
an action should proceed as a class action is significant in relation to access to justice.17  
This process is important in ensuring that the parties to the litigation are treated equitably and 
fairly, for example, defendants are permitted to know the case that they are to meet at an early 
                                                          
13 RP Mulheron ‘The class action in common law legal systems: a comparative perspective’ (2004) 23; E Hurter 
‘Certification: the procedure, its role in class action proceedings in Ontario and the proposed South African 
certification procedure’ (2000) Comparative and International Law Journal of South Africa 42, 42;46. 
14 Hurter (note 5 above) 489. 
15 Ibid 494. 
16 DR Hensler ‘Using class actions to enforce consumer protection law’ in Howells G, Ramsay I, Wilhelmsson T 
(eds) Handbook of Research on International Consumer Law 521. 
17 RP Mulheron ‘The class action in common law legal systems: A comparative perspective’ (2004) 24. 
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stage of the litigation.18 It prevents the court from feeling overburdened by the procedures that 
need to be followed by granting the court an opportunity to deal with preliminary procedural 
issues prior to dealing with the merits of the case at subsequent proceedings.19  
Certification also allows for the ordinary litigation process, which is over burdened by the large 
number of litigants in an action, to be adapted, controlled and extended in order to cater for more 
complex litigation as found in a class action.20 The process of certification allows for proper and 
effective management of the class action21 and lessens the risks of inadequate representation, 
conflicts of interest and abuse of the res judicata principle.22 
The certification process provides a system to combat the inadequacies of the “joinder” device as 
found under the common law. Rule 10 of the Uniform Rules of Court allows parties and causes 
of action to be joined in order to bring one action before the court.23 This rule allows an 
individual litigant to represent another only where both litigants can be joined as co-litigants in 
the matter.24 Each litigant is required to maintain its own claim. This poses a problem where 
there is a multitude of litigants because the citing of individuals as co-litigants becomes a 
tedious, time-consuming and impractical exercise. Class actions therefore provide a procedure 
that caters to the collective interests of the litigants through one representative litigant and there 
is no need for the individual members of the proposed class to be present at the litigation. The 
certification process also allows, unlike the strict procedural rules that govern joinder, a variation 
or differentiation in the claims of the litigants and the remedies sought by the proposed class 
members.25  
                                                          
18 De Vos (note 9 above) 645. 
19 E Hurter ‘Certification: the procedure, its role in class action proceedings in Ontario and the proposed South 
African certification procedure’ (2000) 33 Comparative and International Law Journal of South Africa 42, 47. 
20 Ibid 42. 
21 Hurter (note 5 above) 489. 
22 Mulheron (note 13 above) 24. 
23 Rule 10(1) of the Uniform rules of Court states: (1) Any number of persons, each of whom has a claim, whether 
jointly, jointly and severally, separately or in the alternative, may join as plaintiffs in one action against the same 
defendant or defendants against whom any one or more of such persons proposing to join as plaintiffs would, if he 
brought a separate action, be entitled to bring such action, provided that the right to relief of the persons proposing 
to join as plaintiffs depends upon the determination of substantially the same question of law or fact which, if 
separate actions were instituted, would arise on each action, and provided that there may be a joinder conditionally 
upon the claim of any other plaintiff failing. 
24 JS van Wyk ‘The need and requirements for a class action in South African law with specific reference to the 
prerequisites for locus standi in iudicio’ (LLM thesis, University of Pretoria, 2010) 8. 
25 Hurter (note 19 above) 48. 
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The American federal class action regime, the Canadian provincial model and the Australian 
federal regime are considered to be the leaders in the field of class actions, with the American 
and Canadian jurisdictions adopting the certification process.26 An analysis of the general trends 
of these regimes in adopting a class action procedure is helpful in determining what procedure 
would be best suited to South Africa. 
2.2 THE OPT IN PROCEDURE vs. THE OPT OUT PROCEURE 
Even though class members are absent and unnamed at the early stages of a class action, they 
must be enabled to make informed decisions regarding their participation in the impending 
proceedings. Notices are therefore important in informing class members of the status of the 
litigation and to request that they either include or exclude themselves from being bound by the 
court’s judgment.27 Class members are therefore required to actively opt into proceedings, or opt 
out of them, depending on which procedure or form of notice is being used. 
A notice in the form of the opt in model calls upon members of a potential class to affirmatively 
state that they wish to be part of the litigation as members of the class.28 The opt in model allows 
an individuals to participate in the class action suit only if they wish to do so.29 This model is 
advocated for many reasons. The main advantage is that if an individual opts into the litigation, 
he or she shows a genuine class interest,30 on the other hand a failure to opt in does not preclude 
that individual from bringing his or her own separate action.31 
The opt out model allows for members that have been included in the class action to actively 
indicate that they wish to be excluded. This may be because these individuals wish to pursue 
individual claims against the defendant(s) or if they are not satisfied with the settlement terms.32 
Some advantages of the opt out model are: 
                                                          
26 De Vos (note 2 above) 742.  
27 BJ Rothstein & TE Willging Managing class action litigation: A pocket guide for judges (2005) 18-19. 
28 Hensler (note 16 above) 522; De Vos (note 9 above) 646. 
29 Mulheron (note 13 above) 30. 
30 EH Cooper ‘Class action advice in the form of questions’ (2001) 11 Duke Journal of comparative & International 
Law 215, 230: A genuine interest is present when the individual opts into the class litigation as this shows that that 
he has reflected on the issues at hand and considered the potential conflicts and adequacy of representation. 
31 Mulheron (note 13 above) 30. 
32 Mulheron (note 13 above) 34; E Hurter ‘The class action in South Africa: Quo vadis?’ (2008) De Jure 293, 300; 
JC Alexander ‘An introduction to class action procedure in the United States’ 9, available at 
httplaw.duke.edugrouplitpapersclassactionalexander.pdf, accessed on 21 April 2013. 
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 the regime enhances access to justice by including all individuals until they opt out;33 
 silent class members are not denied redress;34 and 
 it discourages forum shopping.35 
If individuals fail to opt out of the class action they will be bound by the judgment of the court, 
favourable or not.36 This is one of the disadvantages of the opt out model. There is failure to take 
into consideration those individuals who may not have received notice of the impending class 
action resulting in the loss of legal autonomy. It has been submitted by Beisner that the opt out 
model should be rejected due to its “anti-consumer effects” such as litigation risks, internal 
conflicts between class member and conflicts between the class members and the 
representative.37 
Despite the disadvantages, the jurisdictions discussed in this paper have all adopted the opt out 
model of notice because it increases access to justice for individuals who would not ordinarily be 












                                                          
33 Mulheron (note 13 above) 37. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid 35. 
36 JC Alexander ‘An introduction to class action procedure in the United States’ 8, available at 
httplaw.duke.edugrouplitpapersclassactionalexander.pdf, accessed on 21 April 2013; Mulheron (note 13 above) 38. 
37 JH Beisner ‘”Opt-in” vs. “opt-out” procedures in collective and representative litigation’ (United States Chamber 
Institute for Legal Reform) 7 available at  
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/sites/default/files/images2/stories/documents/pdf/international/optoutpaper.p




THE AMERICAN FEDERAL CLASS ACTION REGIME 
 
3.1. THE CERTIFICATION PROCESS  
The idea of a class action was first developed in the United States of America and many other 
jurisdictions have been influenced by the procedure adopted in this particular jurisdiction.38 In 
both legal articles and case law, representative litigation is often referred to as “American-style 
class action” because it has been extensively used, particularly for consumer matters, in the 
United States.39 
 
3.1.1The requirements for the certification of a class action  
These requirements are stated in Rule 23 of the United States Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
(Annexure A).40 This process is divided into two stages – First, all the requirements laid down in 
Rule 23(a) must be satisfied and then the requirements laid down in Rule 23(b) must be satisfied. 
The requirements under Rule 23(a) are briefly numerosity, commonality, typicality and 
adequacy. Rule 23(b) states predominance and superiority as requirements. Subsequent 
amendments to the Federal rules were introduced by the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA).41 
 
(a) Numerosity 
The first requirement of certification is listed in Rule 23(a)(1). This is the requirement of 
‘numerosity’, which entails a finding by a judge that the members of a proposed class are so 
numerous that joinder is impracticable as it would be inconvenient to name each individual party 
in the lawsuit.42 It is important to note that the naming of each individual party need not be 
impossible but merely inconvenient or difficult.43  
                                                          
38 E Hurter ‘Class action: failure to comply with guidelines laid down by courts ruled fatal’ (2010) 2 Journal of 
South African Law 409, 413. 
39 Hensler (note 16 above) 518. 
40 Rule 23 of the United States Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1966 hereinafter referred to as ‘Rule 23’. 
41 Class Action Fairness Act, 2005; De Vos (note 2 above) 743: “The thrust of CAFA is to expand diversity 
jurisdiction of federal courts over class actions and to permit the removal of certain class actions from state courts to 
federal courts.” 
42 NM Pace ‘Class actions in the United States of America: An overview of the process and the empirical literature 
6, available at http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/documents/USA National_Report.pdf, 
accessed on 24 June 2013. 
43 Mulheron (note 13 above) 121. 
19 
 
Mulheron argues that a common sense and general knowledge approach should be taken in 
determining whether the numerosity requirement is satisfied.44 In the case of Paxton v Union 
National Bank45 the Court of Appeal stated that the following factors should be considered in 
determining the numerosity requirement: 
 the number of persons in a proposed class; 
 the nature of the action; 
 the size of the individual claims; 
 the inconvenience of trying the individual suits; 
  the nature of the relief sought; and 
 Any other factor relevant to the practicability of joinder. 
 
Mulheron46 is, however, of the opinion that the numerosity test can be confusing at times due to 
the lack of guidelines as to when joinder may be impracticable for smaller or larger classes. The 
differing individual “common sense” approaches by different judges has also led to 
inconsistency as depicted in the case of Shields v. Local 705, International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters47 and Andrews v. Bechtel Power Corporation48 where in the former case the class 
consisted of thirty-five members and a representative and in the latter case certification was 
denied due to the class consisting of forty-nine members. 
 
(b) Commonality 
In terms of this requirement there must be questions of law or fact which are common to the 
class.49  There needs to be but a single issue50 that is alleged to be ‘common’ and legitimately in 
dispute between the parties.51 In the case of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v Dukes52 Betty Duke, who 
                                                          
44 Ibid 122. 
45Paxton v Union National Bank 519 F.Supp. 136 (1981). The complaint charged that the bank had discriminated 
against plaintiff and the class he represents on the basis of race or color in hiring, testing procedures, promotions, 
raises and job assignments. 
46 Mulheron (note 13 above) 126. 
47 Shields v. Local 705, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 188 F.3d 895, 897 (7th Cir. 1999) available at 
http://classactiondefense.jmbm.com/2006/05/defending_class_actions_certif_3.html, accessed on28 August 2013. 
48Andrews v. Bechtel Power Corp., 780 F.2d 124 (1st Cir. 1985)  
available at http://classactiondefense.jmbm.com/2006/05/defending_class_actions_certif_3.html, accessed on 28 
August 2013. 
49 Rule 23(a)(2) of the United States Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1966.   
50 Mulheron (note 13 above) 169. 
51 Ibid 166. 
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sought to represent women who worked for Wal-Mart stores in a gender discrimination class 
action, was denied certification of her action as she failed to show common questions of law or 
fact between the 1,6 million female class members.53 The court held that what is important to the 
process of certification is the capacity of a class proceeding to generate common answers 
pertinent to the resolution of the litigation.54 
 
(c) Typicality 
The penultimate requirement of certification in terms of Rule 23 is that of ‘typicality’. Rule 
23(a)(3) states that the claims or defenses of the representative parties must be typical of the 
claims or defenses of the class.  
 
Many different meanings can be given to the requirement of typicality. Claims that meet this 
requirement can be based on the same legal theory, factual allegations or essential 
characteristics.55 
 
In the case of The North-West, Inc., et al. v Equal Employment Opportunity Commission et al56 
the typicality requirement was said to “limit the class claims to those fairly encompassed by the 
named plaintiff’s claims.” The claims need not be identical and rather focus should be on the 
essential characteristics of a claim where the minor differences in the claims will not prejudice 
the certification process.57  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
52Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v Dukes 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). In this case the plaintiffs alleged that Wal-Mart had policies 
that allowed local supervisors to exercise their power in a manner that resulted in payment and promotion decisions 
being made subjectively, which perpetrated gender bias in the workplace. 
53 DV Smith ‘Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes: How the record-breaking class action decision was overturned’ 
available at http://employment-law.burgsimpson.com/wal-mart-stores-inc-v-dukes-how-the-record-breaking-class-
action-decision-was-overturned.html, accessed on 28 August 2013. 
54 C Mehri & MD Lieder ‘Onward and upward after the Wal-Mart v. Duke’  
available at http://www.justice.org/cps/rde//justice/hs.xsl/20503.htm, accessed on 28 August 2013. 
55 Mulheron (note 13 above) 310. 
56 The North-West, Inc.  et al v  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission et al 446 U.S. 318, 330 (1980). 
57 E Hurter ‘The class action in South Africa: Quo vadis?’ (2008) De Jure 293, 297. 
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In another case, General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v Falcon58 the court laid down factors 
to determine whether the representative plaintiff’s claim is typical of the class he or she seeks to 
represent: 
 “The representative plaintiff’s situation and that of the prospective class members; 
 the circumstances surrounding the representative plaintiff’s grievance and those 
surrounding the prospective class members’ grievances; and 
  the relief sought by plaintiff and that sought by the class.” 
Although an express requirement, ‘typicality’ is said to closely overlap with the concepts of 
‘commonality’, ‘superiority’ and ‘adequacy of representation’ which suggests that the 
requirement may be redundant.59 In the case of Estate of Mahoney v RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co60 
it was stated that where the requirements of commonality and superiority are unsatisfied, it is 
difficult to attach much significance to the requirement of typicality. This has led to many United 
States’ courts eliminating this requirement from their certification process.61  
(d) ‘Adequacy’ 
This is the final requirement listed in Rule 23(a) and requires that the representative will fairly 
and adequately protect the interests of the class.62 Courts usually interpret this requirement as 
being counsel’s ability to effectively litigate or drive the litigation on behalf of the class.63  
Rule 23 requires that the representative be a member of the class as in litigating his own interests 
he will ensure that he conducts himself to the best of his ability.64 This allows members of the 
class to comfortably place complete confidence in the class representative to adequately 
represent them and their interests.65 
                                                          
58General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v Falcon 457 U.S. 147 102 S Ct 2364 (1982),available at 
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=case&court=us&vol=457&page=147, accessed on 28 April 
2013. See also Wakefield v. Monsanto Co., 120 F.R.D. 112, 116 (E.D. Mo. 1988); AB Spencer ‘Class actions, 
heightened commonality, and declining access to justice’ (2013) 93 Boston University Law Review 441, 469. 
59 Mulheron (note 13 above) 310-313. 
60Estate of Mahoney v RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co 204 FRD 150, 154 (SD Iowa 2001) 5-9. 
61 Mulheron (note 13 above) 313. 
62 Rule 23(a)(4) of the United States Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1966.   
63 Hensler (note 16 above) 520. 
64 De Vos (note 9 above) 643. 
65JC Alexander ‘An introduction to class action procedure in the United States’ 7, available at 
httplaw.duke.edugrouplitpapersclassactionalexander.pdf, accessed on 21 April 2013 : “A fiduciary relationship is a 
special relationship of trust and confidence in which another person relies on the fiduciary to protect his interests. 
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In the case of General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v Falcon66 it was stated that the 
representative must not have conflicting interests with that of the other class members.67 In some 
situations the adequacy of the representative is negated. These are as follows: 
 Conflict of interests on the common issues;68 
 A competitive relationship between the representative and the class members that gives 
rise to conflict;69 and 
 Where the relief sought is not beneficial to all members of the class.70 
3.1.2 Rule 23(b) 
As stated previously, once the requirements of Rule 23(a) are met the action must fall into one of 
the categories of Rule 23(b). The most significant category is Rule 23(b)(3). This rule is 
applicable to class actions where damages are claimed. The rule lists two additional requirements 
over and above the four requirements in Rule 23(a) – ‘predominance’ and ‘superiority’.71 This 
means that the judge must find that “the questions of law or fact common to the members of the 
class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members” and “that a class action 
is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.”72 
 
(a) Predominance 
In the case of Watson v Shell Oil Company73 the predominance requirement was said to require 
that common issues constitute “a significant part of individual cases.” Other cases have stated 
that the test for predominance requires that the proposed class is “to be sufficiently cohesive to 
warrant adjudication by representation” or “that the issues in the class action that are subject to 
generalized proof, and thus applicable to the class as a whole, predominate over those issues that 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
One with a fiduciary obligation must put the other’s interests above his own, and must not act with any conflict of 
interest.” 
66General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v Falcon (note 58 above). 
67 Mulheron (note 13 above) 276. 
68 Ibid 277. 
69 Ibid 278. 
70 Ibid 284. 
71 Pace (note 42 above) 12. 
72 Rule 23(b)(3) of the United States Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1966.   
73 Watson v Shell Oil Company 979 F 2d 1014 (5th Cir 1992).  
available at http://www.leagle.com/decision/19921993979F2d1014_11821 accessed on 28 April 2013. 
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are subject only to individualized proof.”74 The court is not required to engage in a numerical test 
of weighing the number of individual issues against the number of common issues. However, 
where individual issues outweigh the common issues, the court has in some circumstances 
denied certification.75 In most circumstances, the court looks for the trend that the common 
issues be weightier that the individual issues. 
 
(b) Superiority 
The requirement of ‘superiority’ asks the court to balance the merits of a class action against 
alternate methods of adjudication.76 The court must also ensure that a class proceeding is best 
suited to the handling of the claims in comparison to other available methods of adjudication.77 
In a case involving the infringement of consumer rights it was stated that “a class action is the 
more efficient procedure for determining liability and damages in a case such as this, involving a 
defect that may have imposed costs on tens of thousands of consumers yet not a cost to any one 
of them large enough to justify the expense of an individual suit.”78 
 
This requirement is considered to be irrelevant unless the other requirements listed in Rule 23(a) 
are met along with the predominance requirement and it is considered to be unfulfilled if the 
class action is proved to be unmanageable due to size, notice or distribution considerations.79 If 
alternative methods of resolution are available to class members but not feasible, then they are 
                                                          
74 Rutstein v  Avis Rent-a-Car Sys. Inc., 211 F.3d 1228, 1233 (11th Cir. 2000) and Amchem Prods. Inc. v Windsor, 
521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997) available at http://www.law360.com/articles/74785/class-action-killer-the-predominance-
requirement, accessed on 28 August 2013. 
75 Mulheron (note 13 above) 200. See also Butler v Sears Roebuck and Co., U.S Court of Appeals, 7th 
Circuit[November 13 2012] available at http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-7th-circuit/1615665.html, accessed on 24 
July 2013. In this case an appeal was brought due to the district judge denying certification of a class action relating 
to defective washing machines sold by Whirlpool and Sears to consumers. The district judge denied certification 
because the common questions did not predominate over individual questions.  
76 In re Prudential Insurance Company of America Sales Practices Litigation 148 F 3d 283 (3d Cir 1998) available 
at http://www.leagle.com/decision/1998431148F3d283_1393, accessed on 28 April 2013. 
77 Hurter (note 19 above) 45. 
78 Butler v Sears Roebuck and Co.U.S Court of Appeals, 7th Circuit [November 13 2012] available at 
http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-7th-circuit/1615665.html, accessed on 24 July 2013.  
See also Whirlpool Corporation v Gina Glazer U.S. Court of Appeals, 6th Circuit [July 18 2013] accessed at 
http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/13a0180p-06.pdf on 23 July 2013. 
79 Mulheron (note 13 above) 220; De Vos (note 9 above) 649; Hurter (note 5 above) 489. 
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considered to be unavailable due to infeasibility.80 Some factors that determine whether a class 
action is the superior device to handling claims are mentioned in Rule 23(b)(3) as well as: 
 the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action;81 
 the class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of 
separate actions;82 and 
 the comparison of the costs of one class action and individual actions.83 
3.2 DEFINING A CLASS 
In defining the class, ‘commonality’ and ‘typicality’, as mentioned above, are the key 
requirements that need to be satisfied.84 In terms of Rule 23 a class is only required to be 
ascertainable and not specified in a manner that would render the ascertainment of a class 
definition very stringent.85 The time-consuming task of specifically naming individual class 
members is therefore not required. In order to identify a class, an objective approach is taken and 
the merits of the case are not analysed, unless it is necessary to inquire into them in order satisfy 
the requirements for certification.86 Rule 23(c)(4) also provides for sub-classes in class action 
suits which allows the courts to tackle certain individual issues.87 This means that if there are 
individuals with similar claims but they are in different positions or have varying interests from 
the whole class, a sub-class can be formed to deal with these issues that are common to a smaller 
group of individuals. 
3.3 NOTICE TO THE CLASS  
In order to satisfy due process requirements, Rule 23(c)(2) prescribes that notice of a class action 
must be given, the type of notice to be given and what the notice is to state.88 This Rule 
                                                          
80 Mulheron (note 13 above) 223. These alternative measures may be joinder, intervention, consolidation, a test case 
or an administrative proceeding. 
81 Alexander (note 65 above). 
82 Rule 23(b)(3)(A) of the United States Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1966.   
83 Mulheron(note 13 above) 232. 
84 Hurter (note 57 above) 297. 
85 Hurter (note 5 above) 494. There is therefore no need to provide a list of names and addresses of each of the class 
members and this will not be fatal to the action brought. See also Mulheron (note 13 above) 322. 
86 Mulheron (note 13 above) 330; Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Retirement Plans & Trust Funds 133 S. Ct., available at 
http://www.leagle.com/decision/In%20SCO%2020130227E52, accessed on 18 august 2013.  
87 Hurter (note 57 above) 297; Hurter (note 5 above) 494. 
88 Rule 23(c)(2) states “ (A) For (b)(1) or (b)(2) Classes. For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2), the 
court may direct appropriate notice to the class. 
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highlights the opt out model which is favoured by United States jurisdiction and which has been 
adopted by many other jurisdictions.89  
Rule 23(c) (2)(B) refers to “the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances, including 
individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort” to be given. 
This requirement has been interpreted by some courts to imply reasonable notice while other 
courts have taken a stricter approach and interpreted it literally as in the case of Eisen v Carlisle 
& Jacquelin.90 Often individual notice is sent via mail, which is sometimes supplemented or 
even substituted by mass media.91 In terms of Rule 23(b)(3) actions however, notice is 
mandatory if individual class members can be identified.92 The mandatory nature of the notice in 
terms of damages claims (as in Rule 23(b)(3)) varies in other jurisdictional regimes.93 
3.4 SETTLEMENT OF A CLASS ACTION 
Rule 23(e) sets out the procedure that needs to be followed in settlement cases. The court must 
give notice of the settlement to all class members,94 it must approve the settlement only after a 
hearing and finding of it being fair and adequate95 and it must refuse approval in circumstances 
where an opt out notice is needed and not provided.96  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(B) For (b)(3) Classes. For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the court must direct to class members the best 
notice that is practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified 
through reasonable effort. The notice must clearly and concisely state in plain, easily understood language: 
(i) the nature of the action; 
(ii) the definition of the class certified; 
(iii) the class claims, issues, or defenses; 
(iv) that a class member may enter an appearance through an attorney if the member so desires; 
(v) that the court will exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion; 
(vi) the time and manner for requesting exclusion; and 
(vii) the binding effect of a class judgment on members under Rule 23(c)(3).” 
89 Both the Canadian and Australian regimes have adopted this model. 
90 Eisen v Carlisle & Jacquelin 417 US 156 94 S Ct 2140 (1974). See De Vos (note 9 above) 647 for a brief 
explanation of the facts and judgement of this case. 
91 Hensler (note 16 above) 523; Pace (note 42 above) 40; Alexander (note 65 above) 8: mass media may include 
“newspaper, television and radio advertisements, product package inserts, billing inserts, notices mailed to doctors’ 
offices for posting, internet websites, and other methods likely to reach class members.” 
92 As stated in 23(c) (2)(B) of the United States Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1966. See also Mulheron (note 13 
above) 338; 349. 
93 Mulheron (note 13 above) 337. 
94 Rule 23(e)(1) of the United States Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1966. 
95Ibid Rule 23(e)(2). 
96 Ibid Rule 23(e)(4). 
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A class action suit cannot be settled unless court approval has been given and members of the 
class are notified of the proposed settlement in a manner prescribed by the court.97 Judges are 
required to act as protectors of the rights of the parties in scrutinizing the settlement terms to 
ensure that just and reasonable terms have been reached without the presence of collusion.98 
This, along with a court hearing on the settlement, where members of the class are given an 
opportunity to object to terms of the settlement,99 goes a long way in preventing a situation 
where the representative disposes of the class members’ rights without their consent.100 
3.5 MONETARY RELIEF 
There are various devices which can be used by the court to ascertain the monetary relief to be 
granted to the members of the class. Rule 23 does not prescribe what type of awards can be made 
nor does it prescribe how these awards are to be distributed. It is ultimately up to the judge to 
decide on the type of damages awards and how the awards are to be distributed.101 This must be 
the option that is in the best interests of the class. 
With an individual damages assessment, the court determines the amount due to each member of 
the class on an individual basis.102 However, De Vos is of the opinion that this device can 
sometimes be impractical as it is both time consuming and tends to overburden the class action 
proceedings.103 He goes on to state that in these circumstances, aggregate monetary awards may 
be a better option. This process allows the awarding of damages by estimation to a class as a 
whole, instead of the awarding of damages on an individual basis where evidence on each claim 
must be produced.104 Here, the class members are not required to prove their actual loss in 
separate trial proceedings which aids in the process because it is less costly and time-
consuming.105 
                                                          
97 De Vos (note 9 above) 652. 
98 De Vos (note 9 above) 652; Hensler (note 16 above) 521. See also Alexander (note 65 above): “class actions 
require more active supervision from the trial judge…They are expected to play an active role in settlement 
negotiations.” 
99 Alexander (note 65 above) 9. Only after this hearing is settlement approved by the court. 
100 Cooper (note 30 above) 238. 
101 Pace (note 42 above) 43. 
102 Mulheron note (13 above) 407. 
103 De Vos (note 9 above) 648. 
104 De Vos (note 9 above) 648; Mulheron (note 14 above) 408: “aggregate assessment is judicially sanctioned under 
Rule 23, but only in suitable cases.” 
105 Mulheron (note 13 above) 408;412. 
27 
 
Distribution of monetary compensation to the class members can happen individually (by direct 
distribution), by average distribution (pro-rata shares of a lump sum) or by cy pres distribution, 
as directed by the court.106 According to Mulheron,107 direct distribution of compensation can be 
made to individual class members by the defendant, a court fund which the defendant has paid 
compensation into, or a trust. Class members may be required to participate in this distribution 
by, inter alia, filling out claim forms or submitting affidavits. Cy pres distribution (“fluid 
recovery”) occurs in circumstances where the cost of distributing compensation to individual 
class members is infeasible or impracticable.108 Examples of cy pres distribution includes a court 
order ordering the defendant to temporarily employ a reduced charge for services that he 
previously overcharged for,109 or one that orders a defendant who mislead consumers to support 
a consumer or educational programme that will be to the benefit of the class members.110 There 
has, however, been a great deal of debate regarding the use of the cy pres method of distribution 
under the U.S class action regime.111 
A non-monetary distribution that occurs most commonly in consumer class actions is the coupon 
distribution or settlement method.112 Defendants are required to provide coupons to the class 
members at certain points of purchase to either reimburse them directly, provide free 
merchandise or discounts on purchases.113 
 
 
                                                          
106 Hensler (note 16 above) 524. 
107 Mulheron (note 13 above) 424. 
108 Ibid 426: “cy pres distributions have been utilised where class members are difficult to identify, or where they 
change constantly, or where the claims of the individual class members are so small in quantum that they will not be 
pressed or economically distributed.”; Hensler (note 16 above) 524: “if the cost of distributing the compensation 
fund to consumers is very high or it is infeasible to distribute to individuals.” 
109 De Vos (note 9 above) 649. 
110 Cooper (note 30 above) 244. 
111 Mulheron (note 13 above) 428-430. In In re Thornburg Mortgage, Inc. Securities Litigation, 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 107934 (July 24, 2012) the court highlighted problems with the cy pres method of distribution by stating as 
follows: “(i) class actions are disputes between parties and the money damages should remain among the parties, 
rather than be distributed to some third party; (ii) it is unseemly for judges to engage in the selection of third party 
beneficiaries and to distribute class action damages to third parties; (iii) judges are often not in the best position to 
choose a charitable organization that would best approximate the unpaid class members’ interests; and (iv) the 
doctrine encourages charitable organizations, and plaintiffs’ lawyers, to lobby the court for cy pres awards.” 
Available at http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=eb516ca0-1b60-4ea8-9764-760549453dcd accessed on 
19 November 2013. 
112 Alexander (note 65 above) 15. 




THE CANADIAN PROVINCE OF ONTARIO CLASS PROCEEDING REGIME 
One of the Canadian provinces that has adopted a class action procedure is the province of 
Ontario. In Ontario class actions are regulated by the Class Proceedings Act (Annexure B).114 
The word “proceedings” has been used to show that both actions and applications may be 
brought in terms of the Ontario CPA.115 It has been stated that although the Canadian regime 
resembles the regulatory framework of the American federal rule, it is far less convoluted and 
devoid of the intricacies of the American regime.116 
According to section 2 of the Ontario CPA there must also be a motion of certification brought in 
order to classify an action as a class proceeding and to appoint a class representative. The 
requirements for certification are listed in section 5 of the CPA. The claim must disclose a cause 
of action, there must be an identifiable class of two or more persons, the claims of the class must 
raise common issues, a class action must be the preferable procedure for resolving these common 
issues and the representative plaintiff must fairly and adequately represent the interests of the 
class, not have a conflict on the common issues with other class members, and have a workable 
plan for processing the action.117 Hurter submits that the court has a wide discretion in 
determining if the requirements listed in section 5 have been met.118 
 
4.1 THE REQUIREMENTS FOR CERTIFICATION OF A CLASS PROCEEDING 
(a) Cause of action 
The first requirement which refers to the disclosure of a cause of action entails a test of whether 
it is “plain and obvious” that one is lacking.119 In the case of Brown v. Canada (Attorney 
General)120 the importance of identifying a cause of action was highlighted as follows: 
                                                          
114 Class Proceedings Act 1992, SO 1992 c6 hereinafter referred to as the ‘Ontario CPA.’ 
115 W A Bogart, J Kalajdzic & I Matthews ‘Class actions in Canada: A national procedure in a multi-jurisdictional 
society?’4 available at 
http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/documents/Canada_National_Report.pdf, accessed on 21 
April 2013. 
116 Hurter (note 5 above) 489; Hurter (note 57 above) 297. 
117 Section 5(1) of the Ontario CPA. 
118 Hurter (note 19 above) 47. 
119 Hunt v. Carey Canada Inc.,1990 CanLII 90 (SCC), [1990] 2 SCR 959 available at 
http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/1990/1990canlii90/1990canlii90.html accessed on 28 September 2013. 
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“…identification of a cause of action is fundamental. It is impossible for the defendant to 
meaningfully respond to an application for certification without knowing the cause of action. The 
definition of the class and the identification of the common issues depend upon the nature of the 
cause of action… It is not possible to know whether an action can be appropriately prosecuted as 
a class action without identifying the fundamental issue of whether or not there is a cause of 
action.” 
(b) Identifiable class 
For a class action to be certified there must be “an identifiable class of two or more persons.”121 
This class definition is termed the “bare threshold test.”122 Since the Ontario CPA only refers to 
an “identifiable class” it would seem that the identity of each class member is not strictly 
required and that a failure to strictly state the identity and number of class members is not a bar 
to certification.123 This test may seem to open the floodgates when it comes to class action 
litigation, however it has been stated in the case of Lau v Bayview Landmark Inc.124 that the 
satisfaction of this requirement by itself will not result in certification, unless other requirements 
are also satisfied. 
(c) Common issues 
The presence of common issues between the class members is the third requirement of 
certification. ‘Common issues’ are defined in the definition section of the Ontario CPA as being 
“not necessarily identical issues of fact” or “not necessarily identical issues of law that arise from 
common but not necessarily identical facts.” 
When considering section 5 of the Ontario CPA, section 6 of the Ontario CPA must be 
considered simultaneously.125 This section provides that the court shall not refuse to certify a 
proceeding as a class proceeding solely on the grounds that the relief claimed includes a claim 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
120 Brown v. Canada (Attorney General), 2013 ONCA 18, available at 
http://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/2013/2013onca18/2013onca18.html accessed on 28 September 2013. 
121 Section 5(1)(b) of the Ontario CPA. 
122 Hurter (note 5 above) 494; Mulheron (note 13 above) 126. 
123 Mulheron (note 13 above) 126. 
124 Lau v Bayview Landmark Inc (1999), 40 CPC (4th) 301 (SCJ) 26 : “The class definition, and thus the class size, 
also has pertinence to other considerations on certification, such as whether class proceedings would be the 
preferable procedure. Although s5(1)(b) only requires that there be a minimum of two members in the class, it is 
readily apparent that whether a proposed class includes a handful of plaintiffs or conversely, a multitude of 
members, will have an impact on the disposition of the certification motion.”  
125 Hurter (note 13 above) 48. 
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for damages that would require individual assessment after determination of the common 
issues,126 or that different remedies are sought for different class members.127 In this way the 
objective of the Canadian regime in improving access to justice through class proceedings is 
met.128 
(d) Preferable procedure 
As a fourth requirement, the class proceeding must be the preferable procedure for the resolution 
of common issues.129 The Ontario CPA does not provide any express guidelines as to how to 
interpret the ‘preferability’ requirement.130 However, certain factors have been judicially 
considered. In the case of Carom v Bre-X Minerals Limited131 it was stated that a class 
proceeding will be the preferable method of adjudication where it entails a “fair, efficient and 
manageable method of determining the common issues which arise from the claims of multiple 
plaintiffs, and where such determination will advance proceedings in accordance with the goals 
of judicial economy, access to justice and modification of the behavior of wrongdoers.” 
Alternate methods to resolve the dispute or to pursue compensation must also be considered.132 
(e) Representative plaintiff 
The final requirement of certification in terms of the Ontario CPA is that the representative 
plaintiff must fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class, not have a conflict on the 
common issues with other class members and have a workable plan for processing the action.133 
The representative plaintiff must be a member of the class.134 Vigorous prosecution by the class 
representative is ensured by requiring the representative to provide a workable method of 
                                                          
126 Section 6(1) of the Ontario CPA. 
127 Ibid section 6(3). 
128 J Kalajdzic ‘Accessing justice: Appraising class actions ten years after Dutton, Hollick & Rumley’ (2011) 53 
Supreme Court Law Review 3, 4. 
129 Section 5(1)(d) of the Ontario CPA. 
130 Mulheron (note 13 above) 222. 
131 Carom v Bre-X Minerals Limited (1999) 44 OR (3d) 173 239 (SCJ). 
132 Mulheron (note 13 above) 224-225; Hurter (note 19 above) 47: Alternate methods include “individual 
proceedings, joinder, consolidation, test cases and declarations.” 
133 Section 5(e) of the Ontario CPA. 
134 De Vos (note 9 above) 643. 
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advancing the class proceeding and to instruct legal counsel.135 The Ontario CPA has, however, 
catered and allowed for the presence of individual issues being adjudicated upon by the court.136   
4.2. DEFINING A CLASS 
The identity of each class member is not required in great detail under the Ontario CPA and 
provision is made for sub-classes and their protection.137 The Ontario CPA also only prescribes 
that the “best information” regarding the number of members in a class be provided.138 
Differentiation between class members does not preclude the proceeding from being adjudicated 
as a class proceeding.139 Ontario courts have cautioned against subjective class definitions and 
endorsed the use of objective definitions where the enquiry is not just restricted to the 
consideration of the personal circumstances of the class members.140  
4.3 NOTICE TO THE CLASS 
According to the Ontario CPA, notice of certification is required to be given to class members.141 
The court has the power to determine when and by what means notice shall be given by 
considering various factors142 as well as the power to determine the content of the notice.143 
Notice must also be given in circumstances where the court believes individual participation is 
required144 or that it is necessary for the protection of affected persons145 or if there is a 
dismissal, discontinuance, abandonment or settlement of a proceeding.146 It is important to note 
                                                          
135 Mulheron (note 13 above) 291-292. 
136 Section 11(1)(c);section 18(1); section 25(1) of the Ontario CPA. 
137 Hurter (note 5 above) 494; Section 5(2) and section 8(2) of the Ontario CPA. 
138 Section 5(3) of the Ontario CPA. See also section 6(4) of the Ontario CPA. 
139 Hurter (note 19 above) 48: this differentiation may be “individual assessment of damages, separate contracts 
involving different members, or different remedies sought for different members.”  
140 Mulheron (note 13 above) 328-330. 
141 Section 17(2) of the Ontario CPA. 
142 Ibid section 17(3): these factors are “(a) the cost of giving notice; (b) the nature of the relief sought; (c) the size 
of the individual claims of the class members; (d) the number of class members; (e) the places of residence of class 
members; and (f) any other relevant matter”. Section 17(4):  The means by which notice can be given are: “(a) 
personally or by mail; (b) by posting, advertising, publishing or leafleting; (c) by individual notice to a sample group 
within the class; or (d) by any means or combination of means that the court considers appropriate.”;  Section 17(6) 
of the Ontario CPA. 
143 Ibid section 17(6). 
144 Ibid section 18(1). 
145 Ibid section 19(1). 
146 Ibid section 29(4). 
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that notice to class members regarding certification and settlement is not mandatory and subject 
to the discretion of the court as indicated by Section 17(2).147 
The Ontario CPA also favours the opt out model of notice.148 According to the Ontario Law 
Commission, the opt in model is considered to be merely a “permissive joinder device” and that 
the opt out model is more suited to a general class action regime.149 The Ontario CPA expressly 
allows the court to decide whether an opt out notice should be given in all types of class 
actions.150 As can be seen in section 17(4) of the Ontario CPA flexibility and innovation is 
encouraged in deciding on an appropriate method to deliver notice to class members and a single 
statutory method has not been prescribed.151 This section caters for both individual notice and 
non-individual notice. 
4.4 SETTLEMENT OF A CLASS PROCEEDING 
According to section 29 of the Ontario CPA, a class proceeding will come to an end upon court 
approval of a settlement in the matter.152 The settlement will not be binding unless approved by 
court and it will then bind all class members.153 Class members are to be notified of settlement if 
the court deems it fit to order such notice.154 The judge that is approached with settlement must 
ensure that the proposed settlement is fair, reasonable and in the best interests of the class 
members by judicially considering various factors.155 Approving of a settlement that is not in the 
best interests of the class members would be counter-productive to the concept of access to 
justice.156 
 
                                                          
147 G D Watson ‘Class actions: the Canadian experience’ (2001) 11 Duke Journal of Comparative &International 
Law 269,273; Section 17(2) of the Ontario CPA: “The court may dispense with notice if, having regard to the factors 
set out in subsection (3), the court considers it appropriate to do so.” 
148 Hurter (note 57 above) 300. 
149 De Vos (note 9 above) 647. 
150 Mulheron (note 13 above) 341-342. 
151 Ibid 344-346. 
152 Section 29(1) of the Ontario CPA. 
153 Ibid section 29(2); section 29(3). 
154 Ibid section 29(4). 
155 Bogart, Kalajdzic & Matthews (note 115 above) 22: these factors include “the the likelihood of recovery, or the 
likelihood of success; the amount and nature of discovery evidence; settlement terms and conditions; future expense 
and likely duration of litigation; number of objectors and nature of objections; presence of good faith and absence of 
collusion; and information conveying to the court the dynamics of, and the positions taken by the parties during the 
negotiation.” 
156 Watson (note 147 above) 282. See also Epstein v First Marathon Inc.  (2000), 41 CPC (4th) 159 (SCJ). 
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4.5 MONETARY RELIEF 
The court may determine whether individual claims need to be made in order to make awards 
individually157 or it may make aggregate awards or share awards on an average or proportional 
basis.158 The court also has the power to determine whether an award should be paid by the 
defendant by way of a lump sum or in installments.159 
The distribution methods that can be employed by the court are similar to those under the 
American regime and include the defendant distributing the award directly to class members,160 
the defendant paying the award into a depositary161 and any  the method of employing any other 
person to distribute the award directly to individuals.162 The Ontario regime also recognizes and 
approves of the cy pres method of distribution.163 Whichever method the court employs, it must 











                                                          
157 Section 24(2) of the Ontario CPA. 
158 Ibid section 24(1) and section 24(2). See also Bogart, Kalajdzic & Matthews (note 115 above) 24. 
159 Ibid section 26(8). 
160 Ibid section 26(2)(a). 
161 Ibid section 26(2)(b). 
162 Ibid section 26(2)(c). 
163 Ibid section 26(4) and section 26(6). 
164 Ibid section 26(3). 
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CHAPTER FIVE  
THE AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL CLASS ACTION REGIME 
Pt IVA of the Federal Court of Australia Act (Annexure C)165 governs representative 
proceedings in Australia. One of the purposes of the Act is to provide groups of persons pursuing 
consumer claims access to redress in an inexpensive and efficient manner.166 
5.1 THE LACK OF A CERTIFICATION PROCESS 
Australia does not require a certification hearing to commence a representative proceeding.167 
The lack of a certification procedure is based on the opinion that the procedure is more complex 
and time consuming, leading to delays and further expense.168 Instead of the representative party 
approaching the court to satisfy the requirements of certification, the Respondent is instead 
granted opportunities to prove that the threshold requirements for instituting an action have not 
been met by the representative party.169 The respondent does this by way of interlocutory 
applications. It is submitted by Mulheron that this series of interlocutory applications, at the 
commencement of a proceeding, is somewhat equivalent to the certification process and so the 
omission of a certification process is questionable170 In the case of Bright v Femcare Ltd171 the 
court stated that the bringing of numerous interlocutory applications is an intolerable situation 
that prevents speedy determination of issues and results in parties being “bogged down” by 
immaterial issues. 
5.2 THE THRESHOLD REQUIREMENTS 




                                                          
165 Pt IVA of the Federal Court of Australia Act, 1976 hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’. 
166 B Murphy & C Cameron ‘Access to justice and the evolution of class action litigation in Australia’ (2006) 30 
Melbourne University Law review 399, 402. 
167 SS Clark & C Harris ‘Multi-plaintiff litigation in Australia: A comparative perspective’ (2001) 11 Duke Journal 
of Comparative & International Law  289, 296. 
168 Mulheron (note 13 above) 25. 
169 Clark & Harris (note 167 above) 297. 
170 Mulheron (note 13 above) 27; 29. 
171 Bright v Femcare Ltd (2002) 195 ALR 574 160. 
172 Mulheron (note 13 above) 117. 
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(a) Seven or more persons 
The first requirement is that seven or more persons must have claims against the same person in 
order to commence a representative proceeding.173 In the case Tropical Shine Holdings Pty Ltd v 
Lake Gesture Pty Ltd,174 Wilcox J rejected the argument that this requirement would require 
automatic termination of a class action if there were less than seven persons with claims and that 
such an interpretation would give rise to injustice and inconvenience. This opinion could be said 
to be contradictory to what is said in section 33L of the Act.175 It is therefore submitted by 
Mulheron that the numerosity test is unsatisfactory for a number of reasons including that the 
number seven is an arbitrary number of no particular significance.176  
(b) Same, similar or related circumstances 
The second threshold requirement is that group members must have claims that are in respect of 
or arise out of the same, similar or related circumstances.177 According to the case of Zhang v 
Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs178 it was stated that the word 
“related” implies a connection wider than identity or similarity and that the similarities or 
circumstances giving rise to a claim must merit a grouping as a class action. This requirement 
overlaps with the third threshold requirement and it is therefore submitted that it is unconvincing 
that it should be a free standing requirement to commence a representative proceeding.179 
(c) Common issues 
The third and most controversial threshold requirement is that the claims of all persons must give 
rise to a substantial common issue of law or fact.180 It has been held that “substantial” implies an 
issue that is “real or of substance” and not an issue that is “large” or “of special significance”.181 
                                                          
173 Section 33C(1)(a) of the Act. 
174 Tropical Shine Holdings Pty Ltd v Lake Gesture Pty Ltd (1993) 45 FCR 457, 462. 
175 Section 33L of the Act  states: “If, at any stage of a representative proceeding, it appears likely to the Court that 
there are fewer than 7 group members, the Court may, on such conditions (if any) as it thinks fit: 
(a) order that the proceeding continue under this Part; or 
(b) order that the proceeding no longer continue under this Part.” 
176 Mulheron (note 13 above) 117-120. 
177 Section 33C(1)(b) of the Act. 
178 Zhang v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1993) 45 FCR 384, 405 
(Austl.)(French, J.) 
179 Mulheron (note 13 above) 189-190. 
180 Section 33C(1)(c) of the Act. 
181 Wong v Silkfield Pty Ltd (1999) 199 CLR 255, 28. 
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It is important to note that only one substantial common issue of law or fact is needed to fulfill 
this requirement.182 
(d) Superiority 
The ‘superiority’ criteria required to institute a representative proceeding are listed in section 
33N(1) of the Act. The factors mentioned include a consideration of costs of litigation, alternate 
proceedings, efficiency and effectiveness of a representative proceeding in dealing with the 
claims and the otherwise inappropriateness of a representative proceeding in the 
circumstances.183 If the court decides (either of its own accord or an application by the 
respondent) by considering these factors and the interests of justice that the representative 
proceeding should not continue, it may order such.184 
(e) Adequate representative 
Under the Act, an entity that has the capacity to commence a proceeding on its own behalf may 
act as a representative on behalf of others as stated in section 33D(1) of the Act. Practically, it is 
difficult under the Australian regime to find a group member that is willing to be the 
representative party, as this person will have to bear the risk of an adverse costs order.185 The 
representative party is also required to represent the group members in an adequate manner or 
the court may, on application by a group member, substitute another group member as the 
representative party.186  
5.3 DEFINING A GROUP 
Apart from the requirements in section 33C of the Act, the Act allows for a representative 
proceeding to commence even where individual assessments would be require, separate contracts 
are concerned or separate acts or omissions have occurred.187 The court may in these 
circumstances direct that issues not falling within the common issues of the group be determined 
separately by establishing sub-groups, or that an individual group member appear in the 
proceeding for the purpose of determining an issue in relation to that individual.188 Section 33H 
                                                          
182 Clark & Harris (note 167 above) 297. 
183 Section 33N(1)(a)-(d) of the Act. 
184 Section 33N(1) of the Act. 
185 B Murphy & C Cameron (note 63 above) 432. 
186 Section 33T(1) of the Act. 
187 Section 33C(2) of the Act 
188 Ibid section 33Q and section 33R. 
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states that at the establishment of representative proceedings there is no need to provide specific 
details about the group members, the papers are to merely state a description or identify the 
group members.189 
5.4 NOTICE TO THE GROUP MEMEBERS 
According to section 33X(1) of the Act, notice must be given to group members at the 
commencement of a proceeding, if there is an application for dismissal of the proceeding brought 
by the respondent and where there is an application seeking to withdraw the representative 
proceeding. The court has a discretion to dispose of any of the requirements set out where the 
relief sought is one of damages and it may also order that notice be given in any other 
circumstances.190 
The form and content of the notice must specified by the court and the court may order that 
notice be given by a specific person in a particular manner such as through advertisement, radio 
or television broadcast or by any other means.191 Individual notice may be ordered where it is 
reasonably practicable and not unduly expensive.192 This indicates that individual notice may be 
used as a last resort only.193 
The above notices all follow the opt out model. Group members may elect to opt out of the 
proceedings by written notice before a certain date or they will be bound by the judgment of the 
court.194 
5.5 SETTLEMENT OF A REPRESENTATIVE PROCEEDING 
Section 33V of the Act clearly states that a representative proceeding may not be settled or 
discontinued without prior approval of the court.195 This may only be deviated from if the court 
                                                          
189 Ibid section 33H(1); Section 33H(2): “In describing or otherwise identifying group members for the purposes of 
subsection (1), it is not necessary to name, or specify the number of, the group members.” 
190 Section 33X(2) and section 33X(5) of the Act. 
191 Ibid section 33Y(1) – 33Y(4); Clark & Harris (note 167 above) 299; Murphy & Cameron (note 166 above) 432. 
192 Section 33Y(5) of the Act. 
193 Mulheron (note 13 above) 344-345. 
194 Section 33J and section 33Y(8) of the Act. 
195 Ibid section 33V(1). 
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considers it just to do so.196 Settlement of an individual claim must also be done only with the 
approval of the court and this can be obtained at any stage of the proceeding.197  
There are no strict guidelines are present in the Act to guide courts in ascertaining whether a 
settlement is suitable or not, however the court commonly considers, inter alia, the terms of the 
settlement, cost consequences and whether there has been a measure of good faith involved in 
reaching the settlement.198 Group members must also be given notice of the pending settlement 
and given an opportunity to opt out of the proceeding, before the settlement can be approved by 
the court.199 
5.6 MONETARY RELIEF 
The court may award damages on an individual basis or by way of an aggregate amount where a 
reasonably accurate assessment can be made of the total amount of money the group members 
are entitled to.200 In the case of Schutt Flying Academy (Australia) Pty Ltd v Mobil Oil Australia 
Ltd201 as quoted by Mulheron,202 the court interpreted the words “reasonably accurate 
assessment” as one that is not precise but that is “good enough in law.” 
Section 33ZA allows the court to order that the monetary award be distributed to the group 
members through a fund that the Respondent pays into either by way of a lump sum or 
installments.203 It is submitted that the court may order that monetary relief be paid directly to 
members of the group through the use of section 33Z(2). The cy pres method of distribution has 
not been sanctioned under the Australian regime.204 
 
 
                                                          
196 Ibid section 33X(4). 
197 Ibid section 33W(1). 
198 Mulheron (note 13 above) 397-405. See also Murphy & Cameron (note 163 above) 428 : “The test is whether the 
proposed settlement is fair, reasonable or adequate in the interests of group members. In considering whether a 
proposed settlement satisfies this test, the courts will have regard to such factors as: the complexity and duration of 
the litigation; the reaction of the class to the settlement; the stage of the proceedings; the risks of establishing 
liability and damages; and the reasonableness of the settlement, in light of the best recovery and the risks of 
litigation.” Clark & Harris (note 164 above) 305. 
199 Section 33X(4) of the Act. 
200 Ibid section 33Z(1)(e); section 33Z(1)(f); section 33Z(3). 
201 Schutt Flying Academy (Australia) Pty Ltd v Mobil Oil Australia Ltd (2000) 1 VR 545 (CA). 
202 Mulheron (note 13 above) 415. 
203 Section 33ZA(1) of the Act. 




LESSONS LEARNT FROM THESE FOREIGN JURISDICTIONS 
It can be seen that in the American, the Canadian Province of Ontario and the Australian 
jurisdictions the usual civil procedure mechanisms adopted are incompatible with the resolution 
of shared claims of vulnerable litigants. Therefore, the main reason for these jurisdictions 
enacting class action legislation is to increase access to justice by providing an effective 
procedural system to manage multiple claims and the collective interests of the individuals who 
wish to form a class. 
The United States of America has been at the forefront of class action litigation with Ontario and 
Australia adopting many of its features. The American class action system is described as 
complex, complicated, convoluted and technical.205 Despite this, both Ontario and Australia have 
structured their class action regimes on this model, albeit in a more simplified manner. There are, 
however, important differences between the procedures adopted by these jurisdictions. 
6.1 FORMS OF CLASS ACTIONS206 
The American class action regime provides for three different types or categories of class 
actions. These are the mandatory class action, the injunctive class action and the common 
questions class action.207 Ontario provides for a general class action, with no specific 
categorization of actions, as does the Australian regime.208 This general class action model is the 
favoured approach because it allows for class actions to be brought in terms of all legal issues 
instead of restricting the applicability of a class action to certain legal issues or certain relief that 
is being claimed. This approach is also beneficial to judges who are confronted with a class 
action because they do not need to spend time deciding which category of class action is most 
appropriate. They can simply apply the general class action requirements to any class action that 
may come before them. 
 
 
                                                          
205 Hurter (note 5 above) 489; Hurter (note 57 above) 295. 
206 For ease of reference the term ‘class action’ will be used to refer to class actions, class proceedings or 
representative proceedings under the American, Ontario and Australian regimes respectively. 
207 De Vos (note 9 above) 643. 
208 De Vos (note 2 above) 744. 
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6.2 CERTIFICATION OF A CLASS ACTION 
The American class action regime lists more requirements to bring a class action in comparison 
to the regime adopted in Ontario. As discussed above, section 5 of the Ontario CPA states that 
only 5 requirements are to be met before certification of an action can be granted. This increases 
access to justice for individuals in Ontario as opposed to those in the United States of America 
who are required to meet Rule 23 requirements. The Ontario CPA also makes it clear under what 
circumstances certification may not be refused thereby increasing access to justice. Unlike the 
United States of America and Ontario, Australia has not adopted a certification process. Despite 
the reasons put forward for the omission of the certification process together with the possibility 
of it resulting in in-depth administrative responsibilities on the part of judges, overall, the risks of 
a sloppy class action are too great without a certification procedure.209 
6.3 NUMEROSITY 
The American class action regime requires that joinder be impracticable when assessing whether 
an action should proceed as class action. The Australian and Ontario class action regimes have 
differing versions of the numerosity requirement. The Ontario CPA requires that there be an 
identifiable class of two or more persons while the Australian position is that seven or more 
persons must have claims against the same person in order to commence a representative 
proceeding. Depending on what factors the courts take into account regarding the 
impracticability of joinder test, there will be discrepancies in when a class will be certified under 
the American regime. The Ontario and Australian regimes specify a number of persons that must 
be met in order to meet the numerosity requirement. This approach is restrictive and has no 
bearing on the complexities of the litigation. It is possible that a smaller class action may prove 
to be more complex than that of a larger class. It is also more likely that the smaller the class, the 
less likely it is that an action will be certified to proceed as a class action. Flexibility should be 
present when satisfying this requirement and therefore the favoured approach would be that of 
the American regime.  
6.4 COMMONALITY 
The American, Ontario and Australian class action regimes require that there be common issues 
of law or fact between the class members. Both the Ontario and Australian class action regimes 
                                                          
209 Cooper (note 30 above) 231. 
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state that common issues of law or fact must arise from similar circumstances of the class 
members. There is also no strict requirement in any of these jurisdictions that the common issues 
of law or fact between the class members be identical. It is merely an enquiry of which issues 
would arise repeatedly if class members were to bring their claims individually. The 
commonality requirement is significant in the certification process as it determined the class 




Unlike the American class action regime, this requirement has not been expressly mentioned in 
the Australian and Ontario class action regimes. As previously stated the typicality requirement 
overlaps with other requirements mentioned in Rule 23 and therefore it appears unnecessary as a 
stand-alone requirement. The factors used in ascertaining typicality under the American regime 
are catered for under the ‘commonality’ and ‘preferability’ requirements in terms of the Ontario 
CPA.210 It has been submitted that in this way, the American class action regime sets a higher bar 
to certification than Ontario’s class action regime.211 The Australian regime also deems the 
typicality requirement to be an unnecessary requirement that is already catered for under the 
‘commonality’ requirement of the Act.212 Whether included in legislation as a stand-alone 
requirement or incorporated into other requirements, it is important to satisfy the typicality 
requirement in order to ensure that the class representative is actually furthering the interests of 
the class while simultaneously furthering his own individual interest. 
6.6 THE REPRESENTATIVE 
The satisfaction of this requirement is important as the success of the class action is dependent 
on the skill of the representative and because the representative is relied upon by the absent class 
members to enforce their rights.213 Under both the American and Ontario class action regimes 
the class or group representative is required to fairly and adequately represent the members of 
                                                          
210 J Yates ‘Comparison between Canadian and U.S. class actions law and practice’ para 12, available at 
http://www.slideshare.net/jyatesdahlgren/comparison-between-canadian-and-us-class-actions-law-and-practice-
15504793?utm_source=slideshow03&utm_medium=ssemail&utm_campaign=share_slideshow_loggedout, accessed 
on 21 April 2013. 
211 Yates (note 210 above) para 13. 
212 Mulheron (note 13 above) 309. 
213 Hurter (note 57 above) 294. The action becomes res judicata after the class action is determined and the 
individual class members are precluded from reinstituting the action if dissatisfied with the outcome.  
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the class. The Australian regime requires that group members be adequately represented as 
implied in section 33T of the Act. The American and Ontario class action regimes have also not 
adopted the ‘ideological plaintiff’ concept into their certification proceeding. This concept does 
not require that the representative litigant be a member of the class instituting the action even 
though the reality is that there is a possibility of the representative acting on his own interests, to 
the detriment of the other members of the class.214 The Australian class action is different, in that 
it allows for an ideological plaintiff to represent the group members. This position prevents the 
situation where an inexperienced group member is required to represent the class, when a 
Consumer or Competition Commission would be in a better position to do so. 
6.7 PREDOMINANCE 
Unlike the American class action regime, ‘predominance’ is not a requirement in the Ontario 
CPA and therefore this approach is considered to be more liberal than that of the American 
regime.215 Both the Ontario courts and the Supreme Court of Canada have emphatically rejected 
the ‘predominance’ requirement.216 As stated above, under the Australian regime commonality 
requires that the claims of all persons give rise to a substantial common issue of law or fact. 
Even though the Australian regime has no express requirement of ‘predominance,’ it is submitted 
that the use of the word “substantial” in this way equates this requirement to the requirement of 
‘predominance’ under the American regime.217 The Australian regime is the most flexible in this 
regard as the requirement is met by finding just one substantial common issue. The 
predominance requirement − whether as an express or implied requirement − is significant as it 
serves as an adhesive binding individuals through common issues and allowing them to bring an 
action as a class instead of individually. Where there are more individual issues to be decided in 
comparison to common issues, it is does not make sense to bring a class action instead of 
separate individual actions because the adjudicating of individual issues will have to take place 
in any event. 
 
                                                          
214 De Vos (note 9 above) 644.  
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Whilst under the American regime, a class action is required to be superior to other methods of 
adjudication; the Ontario CPA only requires that the class action to be the preferred method of 
adjudication.218 In considering whether a class action is the preferable method of adjudicating, 
the ‘predominance’ requirement is catered for as common issues and individual issues are 
weighed. Both the American and Australian legislation lists factors that are to be considered 
when determining the fulfillment of this requirement. The Ontario CPA, however, does not list 
factors that are to be taken into account in determining the preferability of the class action. The 
absence of guidelines in this manner provides the courts with a wide discretion in deciding 
whether a class action is the preferable method of adjudication which inevitably results in 
inconsistency. A better approach would be to expressly include these factors in legislation or 
court rules so that judges are guided in making their determinations and do not veer off track by 
taking into account irrelevant considerations. 
6.9 CLASS DEFINITION 
Class definition is an important aspect of the certification process as it allows a judge to 
determine which individuals will be bound by the judgment of the court, entitling them to relief 
and who will be eligible to receive notice of the pending class action.219 A class is ordinarily 
shaped in the manner it is described or defined and usually this is one of the most difficult tasks 
associated with class actions.220 The discussed jurisdictions require the class to be merely 
ascertainable and not specifically or individually named. This is because the certification process 
would be unduly burdened and extended if explicit detail of the members were to be required. 
Provision for sub-classes and sub-groups is also made under all of the abovementioned 
jurisdictions. This means that individual issues that are different from the common issues are not 
precluded from being dealt with and are not a bar to certification. This increases access to justice 
for individuals forming the class or group. 
 
 
                                                          
218 Bogart, Kalajdzic & Matthews (note 115 above) 4. 
219 Rothstein & Willging (note 27 above) 7. 
220 Mulheron (note 13 above) 321. 
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6.10 NOTICE TO THE CLASS 
The American, Ontario and Australian regimes require notice to be given to the class members 
under different circumstances. The main reason for this is to enable absent class members to 
firstly be fully aware of the progress of the class action and secondly, to judge how adequately 
they are being represented by the class representative. The different jurisdictions require 
individual notice in certain circumstances but largely the courts have discretion as to what type 
of notice to order and what the notice is to contain. The legislation in each jurisdiction does 
however provide guidelines as to what the notice should state. All three jurisdictions favour the 
opt out model of notice over the opt-in model as it gives effect to one of the core aims of a class 
action – higher participation rates in litigation due to access to justice being increased. 
6.11 SETTLEMENT OF A CLASS ACTION 
The abovementioned jurisdictions require any settlement between the parties to be approved by 
the court. In some instances class actions have been used as a form of blackmail to coerce 
defendants into settlements rather than bearing the costs of class litigation. Therefore, court 
approval of settlements ensures that no coercion is used in bringing about an end to the litigation 
process. Notice to class members of impending settlement is also required to be given and the 
court may only deviate from this procedure under certain circumstances, as under the Australian 
regime. Court approval of settlements is recommended and appropriate as it prevents the 
representative and the defendants from coming to an agreement that may only benefit them. 
Instead the court ensures that the class members’ interests have been adequately seen to by the 
representative in the best possible way. 
6.12 MONETARY RELIEF  
All three of the focus jurisdictions allow for damages to be awarded on an individual basis where 
practical, or on an aggregate or proportional basis. The methods of distribution utilized by these 
jurisdictions are also similar, save for the American and Australian regimes. The American 
regime makes provision for coupon settlements or awards while the Australian regime does not 
recognize the cy pres method of distribution. The problem with both the cy pres and coupon 
concepts is that they do not really compensate the class for injuries they have suffered in 
monetary terms. However, jurisdictions should not be quick to disregard any method of award or 
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distribution, as only the particular circumstances of each case is capable of determining the most 
appropriate method of award and distribution. 
6.13 CONCLUSION  
Class action legislation has been developed and continues to develop in the American, Ontario 
and Australian jurisdictions. Through this analysis of the class action procedures in these 
jurisdictions it is noted that various issues arise during class litigation. These issues cannot be 
entirely catered for through strict interpretation of the legislation and judicial intervention is 
sometimes required, especially during the certification stage of the proceedings.  
The importance of a certification procedure in initiating a class action is held to be a 
distinguishing characteristic of this type of litigation. It sets the stage for the impending action 
and is important in ensuring that absent class members’ rights are catered for. This is by far the 
most important goal of class action litigation – the provision of access to justice for those who 
cannot afford to bring individual actions. Due to the importance of the certification procedure in 
guiding the class action litigation, flexibility should be allowed when interpreting the legislative 
requirements. However, judges are not to be given free reign. They must abide by the legislative 
requirements of certification to the best of their ability keeping in mind the goals of this type of 
specialized litigation. 
In terms of developing a South African consumer class action procedure, adopting and 
implementing any one of these jurisdictions’ class action procedures in its entirety is not 
recommended. This is evidenced by the opposing views of academics. Hurter submits that the 
requirements of the Ontario regime are less onerous and more in line with the “spirit, purport and 
object of the Bill of Rights, in comparison to the American regime.221 On the other hand, De Vos 
submits that the American regime is in harmony with the South African civil procedure model 
and that they “subscribe to the same fundamental principles” thereby making this procedure a 
suitable one for adoption by South Africa.222  
South Africa needs a procedure that is unique to the country’s characteristics. The pros and cons 
of each jurisdiction must be weighed and contrasted to the economic, judicial and social climate 
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222 De Vos (note 9 above) 656. 
46 
 
of South Africa. In this way, the South African legislature will be able to identify the flaws in 
these foreign jurisdictions and ensure that proper precautions are taken. This will ensure that the 
detrimental effects of foreign class action procedures are negated when the formation of a South 





















CHAPTER SEVEN  
THE CURRENT SOUTH AFRICAN APPROACH TO CLASS ACTIONS 
 
7.1 THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND CLASS ACTIONS 
7.1.1 INTRODUCTION 
As previously stated, section 38(c) of the Constitution makes provision for a class action to be 
brought by anyone alleging that a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened. On 
a plain reading of this section, it is deduced that a class action can only be brought where a right 
in the Bill of Rights is infringed and not where one’s rights in terms of competition or consumer 
law have been infringed or threatened. A recent Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) decision cast 
doubt as to whether the court’s interpretation of section 38(c) extended the use of class actions to 
the infringement or threat of rights that are not contained in the Bill of Rights. A discussion of 
both the trial court and Supreme Court judgments is required for proper understanding of the 
current position. 
7.1.2 NGXUZA AND OTHERS v PERMANENT SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF 
WELFARE, EASTERN CAPE, AND ANOTHER 2001 (2) SA 609 (E)223 
The Applicants had received social grants under social legislation and alleged that the 
Respondents had unlawfully cancelled and suspended their grants along with the grants of many 
other pensioners. The Applicants sought to claim relief in the form of a declaration and 
reinstatement of the social grants on behalf of all individuals in the same position and for the 
Respondents to provide the names of these individuals. The Applicants invoked section 38(c) to 
enable them to sue on behalf of all individuals similarly situated and the court had to decide 
whether the applicant could actually use this section for this purpose. 
Froneman J, in delivering his judgment laid down certain guidelines in terms of class action 
procedure since the legislature had not yet signed the SA Law Commission’s Report into 
legislation. The judge also stated many crucial points. He mentioned the contents of section 38(c) 
and stated that there was no valid reason for a restrictive interpretation of the section.224 The 
judge went onto state that despite the problems associated with public interest litigation, the 
                                                          




ability to represent individuals in terms of section 38(c) should not be restricted. Instead proper 
safeguards should be put into place to combat these problems.225  
The court acknowledged the need and use of class action procedure in catering for poorer 
individuals by allowing them to bring their claims collectively thereby increasing access to 
justice.226  
Froneman J also dealt with the common objections of sanctioning a class action as follows. He 
stated that the floodgates of litigation would not be opened due to the exorbitant costs of 
pursuing a matter at Supreme Court level. He then proposed the procedural requirement of an 
applicant having to seek leave from the High Court to proceed on a representative basis before 
initiating a class action.227  
With regard to the problem of classification and the different circumstances of the individuals, it 
was submitted by the judge that the class definition and the common issues must relate to the 
infringement of a fundamental right.228 This determination would also take place when seeking 
leave to proceed on a representative basis.229  
The practical impossibility argument was based on the impossibility of courts to deal with cases 
involving thousands of people. This argument was dismissed when Froneman J stated that “if 
there is a clearly defined class of people who have been wronged in the manner required by s 38, 
it is no answer for either the judicial or administrative arms of government to say that it will be 
difficult to give them redress. If it means that Courts will have to act in new and innovative ways 
to accommodate them, then so be it.” The court referred to the case of Maluleke v MEC Health 
and Welfare, Northern Province230 where evidence was required to identify each of the 
beneficiaries. The court in that case held that the individuals constituted a class “in only the 
vaguest and broadest sense.” Froneman J disagreed with the approach in the case of Maluleke 
and held that in both the Maluleke case and the present case there was a clear infringement of the 
Applicants’ right to just administrative action, a fundamental right found in section 33 of the Bill 
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of Rights.231 The fact that all the individuals suffered infringement of the same fundamental right 
was enough to define the individuals as a class. 
A flexible and generous approach was held to be the appropriate manner of approaching class 
actions.232 Given the fact that there was no legislation to guide the court in approving an action 
as a class action, Froneman J implicitly relied on section 173 of the Constitution233 to develop a 
class action procedure.234 The judge therefore held that the Applicants had standing to bring a 
class action on behalf of other individuals who found themselves in similar circumstances and 
that these individuals were to be given notice of the proceeding and an opportunity to exclude 
themselves from it. The Respondents were unhappy with the judgment in the court-a-quo and 
took the matter on appeal. 
7.1.3 PERMANENT SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF WELFARE, EASTERN CAPE & 
ANOTHER v NGXUZA & OTHERS 2001 4 SA 1184 (SCA)235 
The two main issues that were taken on appeal by the Appellants were class definition and 
jurisdiction of the class action. Generally, Cameron JA defined a class action and stated the need 
for such an action by quoting American authors on the inadequacies of the joinder model as 
follows: 
“The cardinal difficulty with joinder . . . is that it presupposes the prospective plaintiffs' 
advancing en masse on the courts… What is needed, then, is something over and above the 
possibility of joinder. There must be some affirmative technique for bringing everyone into the 
case and for making recovery available to all. It is not so much a matter of permitting joinder as 
of ensuring it.”236 
The judge went onto state that although the Constitution makes provision for a class action, it is 
left to the courts, through section 39(2) and section 173 of the Constitution, to develop and 
implement such procedure.237 The court also held that provisions enabling a class action are to be 
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interpreted generously and expansively as stated in the case of Ferreira v Levin NO and 
others.238 
Cameron JA then proceeded to deal with the issue of class definition. He stated that the 
complaint of the Appellants that the class was not adequately defined was “difficult to 
appreciate.”239 The individuals had all had their social benefits cancelled or suspended. 
Therefore, the court held that the class consists of individuals that are “victims of official excess, 
bureaucratic misdirection and unlawful administration methods” and that this was a situation that 
was “pattern made” for a class action.240 The Judge went onto state how the definition of the 
class met the numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequate representative requirements of a 
class action as found in foreign jurisdictions.241  
The court emphatically agreed with the trial court’s reasoning in being unable to agree with the 
position in the case of Maluleke. It deemed the principles related to class action in Maluleke 
inconsistent with the present judgement and therefore Maluleke was overruled.242 
Based on the above considerations together with the court’s condemnation of government 
conduct, the court dismissed the appeal. 
7.1.4 CONCLUSION 
In essence, the Trial Court decision established many of the requirements already mentioned in 
the foreign jurisdictions’ class action regimes. The request for leave by an applicant to proceed 
on a representative basis is equivalent to the certification proceeding under the American and 
Ontario regimes. The defining of a class and the ascertaining of common issues are also part of 
the certification process of the American and Ontario regimes. The requiring of notice and the 
opportunity for individuals to exclude themselves from the litigation is equivalent to the opt out 
model adopted in the foreign jurisdictions.  
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The Appeal Court decision is considered to be authority for the use of a class action procedure in 
relation to an infringement of a right contained in the Bill of Rights, despite the lack of 
legislation or court rules guiding the process.243 However, it has been submitted that the Appeal 
Court decision quotes the requirements of the American class action regime exactly.244 This 
blind adoption of a foreign jurisdiction’s class action procedure is something to be cautioned 
against as previously discussed. 
Kok submits that the appeal decision indicated an intention to create a general class action.245 He 
based his submission on various “hints” in the Appeal Court decision – the judge in the Appeal 
Court decision did not expressly identify an infringement of a fundamental right, the court found 
the acts of governments to be “unlawful and not unconstitutional and the appeal decision reflects 
a consideration of requirements not required by section 38 of the Constitution.246 Both Hurter 
and De Vos disagree with Kok’s view. They submit that an infringement of a fundamental right 
was identified by Cameron JA in the Appeal Court decision and that the Appeal Court decision 
must be read in context of the Trial Court decision.247 The trial court clearly approached the facts 
of the case in the context of section 38 of the constitution. 
It can therefore be stated that the Ngxuza decisions firmly entrench the notion of a class action 
being used to enforce infringed or threatened constitutional rights. The only question remaining 
is whether the class action model can be extended to cover an infringement of rights that are not 
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7.2 A GENERAL CLASS ACTION 
 In 2012 and 2013, two landmark rulings were handed down by the Supreme Court of Appeal 
(SCA) and the Constitutional Court (CC), respectively. Both these cases set the framework for 
class actions to be brought out of the realm of the Bill of Rights and the judgments are now 
regarded as precedent in class action cases. A discussion of these cases proves helpful in 
ascertaining the current position of non-constitutional class actions in South Africa. 
7.2.1 CHILDREN’S RESOURCE CENTRE TRUST V PIONEER FOOD (50/2012) [2012] 
ZASCA 182 (29 NOVEMBER 2012)248 
In this case the Appellants, who are bread consumers, sought to have an action certified as a 
class action in order to bring their claims collectively against various Respondents, being bread 
cartels. The Respondents were allegedly engaging in anti-competitive conduct in terms of the 
Competition Act249 by fixing the price of bread. When the Competition Commission investigated 
the allegations it was found that the bread cartels were in contravention of the Competition 
Act250 and it was upon this finding that that the Appellants sought certification of their action. 
The main issues to be decided on appeal were when may a class action be brought and what were 
the procedural requirements that needed to be satisfied before its institution. 
The Appellants claimed that the Respondents had infringed their right to sufficient food and 
water as contained in section 27(1)(b) of the Constitution only to bring their claim within section 
38 of the Constitution thereby entitling them to bring a class action. The court held this to be an 
unnecessary attempt by the Appellants to ensure that they were able to bring the action as a 
class.251 The appellants were poor and their individual claims were small in comparison to the 
eventual costs of litigation. Therefore, they were only able to bring the action as a class or not at 
all, which would infringe their right to access to courts as contained in section 34 of the 
Constitution.252 Although the threatened infringement of the right to access to courts would 
entitle the individuals to make use of a class action, Wallis JJA held that: 
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“In my judgment it would be irrational for the court to sanction a class action in cases where a 
constitutional right is invoked, but to deny it in equally appropriate circumstances, merely 
because of the claimants’ inability to point to the infringement of a right protected under the Bill 
of Rights. The procedural requirements that will be determined in relation to the one type of case 
can equally easily be applied in the other. Class actions are a particularly appropriate way in 
which to vindicate some types of constitutional rights, but they are equally useful in the context 
of mass personal injury cases or consumer litigation.”253 
The court referred to the SA Law Commission Report with approval, acknowledging that 
Parliament has not yet enacted legislation as per the Report’s recommendations.254 Wallis JJA 
therefore stated that the courts must use their power in terms of section 173 of the Constitution to 
address this area of law.255 He rejected the idea that the courts should wait for the legislature to 
enact class action law before they deal with actions on this basis.256 However he did state that in 
laying down procedural requirements the court should not usurp the power of the Legislature in 
making policy decisions.257 
The certification process and its requirements were then discussed by the court in a great deal of 
detail. The court often referenced the SA Law Commission Report in its discussion of the 
abovementioned process and requirements. 
The certification process was held to be necessary in the circumstances with Wallis JJA holding 
that there are numerous benefits to the certification process. He pointed out that through the 
certification process, at the outset of the litigation the court is ensured that the interests of those 
being represented are protected and that the defendant is given the opportunity to show at an 
early stage why the action should not proceed. Further, the court is able to oversee the litigation 
process and the conduct of the litigation is facilitated by the issues determined during the 
certification process. The court further stated that a lack of the certification process in foreign 
jurisdictions has not proved useful.258 









In ascertaining the requirements for certification, the court held that they closely resembled those 
laid out in the SA Law Commission Report as well as the requirements laid down by Cameron J 
in the Ngxuza Appeal Court decision and those laid out in Rule 23 of the American class action 
regime.259 Some of the requirements for certification were listed and commented upon by the 
court as follows: 
(1) The existence of a class identifiable by objective criteria 
The court held that it is not necessary to specifically identify the members of a class and that the 
class must merely be defined with sufficient precision so that a particular individual’s 
membership can be easily ascertained.260 The court highlighted the concept of class definition by 
stating that it affects the method by which notice is given to the class members, it is important 
for individuals to know whether they can commence their own litigation if not part of the class 
and it is important in determining who will be bound by the class judgment.261 Wallis JJA 
highlighted the issues of an over-inclusive class definition and a definition formed through 
subjective criteria, thereby favouring a class that has instead been defined by objective criteria.262 
The judge concluded his discussion of this requirement by stating that “the essential question 
will always be whether the class is sufficiently identified that it is possible to determine at all 
stages of the proceedings whether a particular person is a member of the class.”263 
(2) A cause of action raising a triable issue 
The court concluded that there will be no cause of action where there is no prima facie case 
made, if it is based on a legally untenable claim, it lacks evidence to support it or it will be the 
subject of a successful exception.264 In ascertaining a cause of action Wallis JJA stated that “the 
test does not preclude the court from looking at the evidence on behalf of the person resisting 
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certification…That is not an invitation to weigh the probabilities at the certification stage. It is 
merely recognition that the court should not shut its eyes to unchallenged evidence in deciding a 
certification application.”265 The court laid down a procedural guideline relating to the evidence 
to be adduced during the certification proceeding. It stated that Applicants are to set out evidence 
to support the existence of a class in the affidavits accompanying the application for 
certification.266 
(3) Common issues of fact or law 
Wallis JJA indicated that the common issues of law or fact need not be identical but that they are 
common enough to be determined in one action.267 The common aspect of a claim may refer to 
the primary issue to be dealt with while other more specific issues can be dealt by way of sub-
classes.268  
(4) A suitable representative 
The court approved of the ‘ideological plaintiff’ concept by quoting section 38 of the 
Constitution and stating that there should be no differentiation between class actions based on an 
infringement of a right in the Bill of Rights and class actions that are not.269 In ascertaining 
whether a representative is suitable the court asked two questions. First whether the 
representative has interests in the litigation that are in conflict with whom it wishes to represent 
and secondly, whether the representative has the capacity to properly conduct the litigation on 
behalf of the absent class members.270 The court stated that the latter inquiry involved, inter alia, 
the following determinations: 
“has the representative the time, the inclination and the means to procure the evidence necessary 
to conduct the litigation; has the representative the financial means to conduct the litigation and, 
if not, how is it going to be financed; and does the representative have access to lawyers who 
have the capacity to run the litigation properly.” 271 










In this case the class consisting of bread consumers across four provinces of South Africa was 
held to be over-broad and as a result no commonality was established between the class 
members.272 Therefore, the certification of this class failed. The class definition restricted to 
bread consumers in the Western Cape was also described as being too broad of a definition but 
the court held that with statistical information the appellants would be able to define the class 
with the requisite amount of clarity.273 The matter was therefore remitted to the High Court for 
determination.274 
(5) Ascertainable relief and appropriate allocation of damages 
The remedy sought in this case was money to be paid to a trust or similar body that will use the 
funds to fund community and school feeding schemes in order to benefit all consumers 
generally.275 The money would not go directly to the bread consumers to compensate their loss.  
In essence, a cy pres method of distribution was sought. The court unequivocally stated that the 
cy pres method was not a means of compensating the class for the damages that they had 
suffered.276 Wallis JJA, in quoting the contents of the SA Law Commission Report277, stated as 
follows: 
“In my view the suggested remedy is not a permissible one. It departs from the purpose of the 
class action to compensate those who have suffered loss for that loss…The new principle that 
would be created would be that where a large number of people had relatively small claims 
against a defendant, that it would not be worth their while to pursue individually, those claims can 
be confiscated from them by judicial fiat and vested in a person that will be able to use the 
proceeds of those claims in a socially useful manner. In my view that is a bridge we should 
decline to cross.”278 
The court instead proposed that the damages of each individual class member be ascertained on 
an aggregate basis through the use of statistical methods.279 Distribution methods were listed as 
                                                          










an open list including distribution either directly to the class members or in a manner that would 
be directly or indirectly beneficial to them.280 
In light of, inter alia, points (1)-(5) above, the court held that the appeal was to be upheld and the  
class action in respect of the bread consumers in the Western Cape be remitted to the High Court 
for determination with due consideration of the principles that have been laid down in this 
judgment.281 
7.2.2 MUKADDAM V PIONEER FOODS (PTY) LTD AND OTHERS (CCT 131/12) [2013] 
ZACC 23 (27 JUNE 2013)282 
A brief history of this case is relevant to the decision taken in this court. In the High Court283 the 
Applicant and two others sought to bring a class action on the basis that they, as bread 
distributors, suffered damages due to the misconduct of the Respondent bread cartels that 
engaged in price-fixing of bread. This application was brought together with the application in 
the Bread Case. The application for certification in the High Court was dismissed by Van Zyl AJ 
on two grounds, namely, the cause of action raised by the applicants did not give rise to triable 
issues284 and no common issues of fact or law were absent between the members of the proposed 
class.285 
In the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA),286 Nugent JA held that the reliance of the Appellants on 
section 22 of the Constitution was unfitting. The section grants the right to South African citizens 
only and there was no evidence to suggest that all the members of the proposed class were 
citizens.287 Also, some of the claimants were juristic persons while the right in section 22 is 
conferred upon natural persons only.288 The court went onto state that the Competition Act does 
not protect the profits of an enterprise, it is merely protects consumers from the results of over-
competitive conduct.289 The learned judge also submitted that because the applicants sought to 
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use the opt in model; joinder in terms of section 10 of the Uniform Rules of Court would be 
preferable procedure.290 The claim was not found to be “potentially plausible” and the appeal 
was therefore dismissed.291 
The Constitutional Court (CC) in this case was faced with three issues. First, whether the High 
Court correctly exercised its power in refusing certification. Secondly, whether the SCA was 
correct in dismissing the appeal and confirming the High Court’s decision and thirdly, whether 
the correct test of certification was applied by the SCA.292 
Jafta J outlined the fundamental importance of access of justice by quoting from the case of 
Chief Lesapo v North West Agricultural Bank and another293 where it was stated that “very 
powerful considerations would be required for its limitation to be reasonable and justifiable.”  
The court agreed with the SCA in its use of section 173 of the Constitution in laying down 
procedural requirements for certification.294 It stated that the principle guiding the courts power 
in terms of this section was the interest of justice and this is the standard that is to be applied 
when considering certification applications.295 Jafta J added the following to what was said in the 
SCA: 
“These requirements must serve as factors to be taken into account in determining where the 
interests of justice lie in a particular case. They must not be treated as conditions precedent or 
jurisdictional facts which must be present before an application for certification may succeed. The 
absence of one or another requirement must not oblige a court to refuse certification where the 
interests of justice demand otherwise.”296 
The requirements for certification are not to be applied rigidly and class actions are to be 
welcomed by courts as a procedural mechanism available to litigants.297 However, the court must 
maintain full control over the action at all times.298 
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Another innovative point that was made by the court was that certification need not be obtained 
in cases where a class action is instituted against the State where a right in the Bill of Rights has 
been infringed or threatened.299 The court left open the question of whether certification needs to 
be pursued when bringing an action against private companies, as it was not brought before 
them.300 
In considering the interests of justice standard together with the list of factors laid down in the 
SCA, this court held that the list of factors are not exhaustive and that the court may take into 
account any other factor it deems relevant.301 It was against this background that the learned 
judge held as follows: 
“The High Court was asked to negotiate uncharted waters without any guidelines. It is therefore 
understandable that the Court ended up applying a standard other than the interests of justice. As 
a result its decision was based on an incorrect test.”302 
The court held that the reasoning of the SCA in refusing certification was not compelling. The 
issues in this case arose from the same facts in the Bread Case. In that case the matter was 
remitted to the High Court for determination, while in this case the SCA refused certification 
outright.303 Another point that the SCA raised that Jafta J disagreed with was the SCA’s 
interpretation of the Competition Act in supporting the cause of action. Jafta J stated that section 
65(6)(a) of the Competition Act undoubtedly allowed for a party who suffered damages due to 
anti-competitive conduct to approach the court for an assessment or award of damages.304 
The SCA also stated that exceptional circumstances would need to be presented before it allowed 
for an opt in class action to proceed instead of using the joinder device in terms of Rule 10 of the 
Uniform Rules of Court.305 This court disagreed with this approach and instead held that to 








305 Mukaddam v Pioneer Food (49/12) [2012] ZASCA 183 (29 November 2012) 7-8. 
60 
 
require the presence of exceptional circumstances is to go against the standard laid down in the 
SCA.306 
Therefore the CC held that the appeal succeeds and that the matter also be remitted to the High 
Court for determination in accordance with the principles laid down in this court.307  
Although concurring with Jafta J, Mhlantla AJ disagreed on the point of certification. He held 
that the certification procedure has benefits for all and any types of class actions and therefore 
the certification procedure should apply to class actions where they are brought even against the 
State in circumstances where a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened.308 
7.2.3 CONCLUSION 
There are significant contributions that emanated from the SCA judgment in the Bread Case. 
First, the court approved of the principle laid down in the Ngxuza Trial Court decision relating to 
leave being first sought from the High Court to proceed on a representative basis. This 
effectively gave rise to certification proceedings in South Africa. Secondly, the court laid down 
fundamental factors that are to be considered by courts faced with certification proceedings. 
However, due to a lack of legislation in South Africa on class action procedure, the CC’s 
judgment serves as precedent to other courts when approached with prospective class actions. 
Therefore this serves as the current legal position of class action procedure in South Africa. 
The CC in Mukaddam, although approving the standards set down by the SCA in the Bread 
Case, found that these requirements or factors were applied too strictly in its SCA judgment. The 
CC also held that these requirements are not to be treated as conditions precedent to certification 
proceedings and that the absence of anyone of these factors should not be a bar to certification. 
These requirements should not be strictly applied when considering a class action. 
The ultimate test laid down by the CC was that of the interests of justice, which must serve as the 
overriding principle. Whilst this is a laudable aim, it does leave things somewhat in the air. How 
then does the court determine if a class action is the best way forward if it does not meet certain 
requirements laid down specifically for this purpose?  






The CC judgment has given rise to probable situations where a court may certify a class action 
based on a judge’s sense of justice. This means that even if requirements for certification, as laid 
down in the Bread Case, are not satisfied, if it is in the interests of justice to proceed as a class 
action the court may rule accordingly. This would lead to severe consequences such as class 
lawyers pursuing class actions solely for their financial benefit and not with the interests of the 
class members at heart. This is a common occurrence in the United States of America and one of 
the criticisms of class actions in this foreign jurisdiction.  
It is submitted that in stating that the requirements for certification of a class action are not to be 
applied rigidly and that the interests of justice is the overriding consideration, the CC displayed a 
profound ignorance of court procedure. The certification procedure can be viewed as one that 
either promotes or prevents access to justice. However, one must look at these requirements not 
as a block of individual’s rights to sue but rather as a mechanism for the court to ensure that this 
type of proceeding is not abused. The interests of justice would undoubtedly include concepts 
such as access to court, the prevention of abuse of process and speedy litigation. These are the 
same concepts that are considered when applying the requirements for certification laid down in 
the Bread Case. It is difficult to imagine the interests of justice ever justifying the absence of any 
one of the requirements for certification as laid down in the Bread Case.  
 While the SCA in the Bread Case required certification proceedings prior to the institution of all 
class actions, the CC ruled that certification is not a requirement when a claim is instituted to 
enforce an infringed or threatened right in the Bill of Rights against the State. However, no 
guidelines were formulated by the CC regarding certification of proceedings against private 
litigants where a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened.  
The SCA judgment of the Mukaddam case held that certification of an opt in class action 
required the presence of exceptional circumstances. It can be said that in rejecting this argument, 
the CC increased access to justice by laying down the interests of justice test, however this test 
poses its own challenges as mentioned above. 
One of the most important points that can be drawn from the CC judgment is that it confirms that 
class actions are no longer limited to constitutional claims. It confirmed the development of the 
common law and the factors laid down by the SCA in the Bread Case and it eloquently stated 
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that the test to be applied when assessing the suitability of a class action would be the interests of 
justice test. 
Overall, the SCA in the Bread Case and the CC in the case of Mukaddam have laid down 
important guidelines in class action procedure. These guidelines need to be considered together 
with the recommendations contained of the SA law Commission Report. A preferable procedure, 
best suited to South Africa, can only be obtained through a combination of elements that have 



























A PROPOSED PROCEDURE FOR CLASS ACTIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
There is no point to the existence of substantive law if no effect can be given to it procedurally. 
Class actions have proven to be an exceptional method to give effect to Constitutional rights as 
in the Ngxuza Trial Court decision and the Appeal Court decision. However, they can be equally 
beneficial in consumer litigation. The fact that many South African statutes make provision for 
class actions is not an indication of the Legislature reaching its goal of providing access to 
justice. Only once vulnerable litigants can put this provision into practice, can access to justice 
be truly achieved. Therefore, some direction needs to be given to litigants who wish to use this 
form of litigation in seeking judicial redress. Through the amalgamation of foreign jurisdictions’ 
class action legislation, the class action guidelines laid down by South African courts and the 
recommendations of the SA Law Commission’s Report, the Legislature should be able to 
introduce legislation to govern class action procedure in the best way possible. In this way, both 
the theoretical and practical aspects of class action procedure can be considered together with the 
identified pitfalls found in foreign jurisdictions’ class action procedures. 
8.1 ELEMENTS OF THE PROPOSED PROCEDURE 
8.1.1 A PROCEDURE THROUGH LEGISLATION OR COURT RULES 
Currently in South Africa, there is no legislation governing class action procedure. In the 
abovementioned foreign jurisdictions, both Ontario and Australia have enacted class action 
legislation, while the United States of America has opted for a rule of court instead. Academics 
submit that further development of a class action procedure should not be left entirely to the 
courts as a legislative framework guiding this procedure would be preferable in ensuring 
consistency.309 Courts must be able to apply the same rules to all prospective class actions 
brought before them. The SA Law Commission recommended that “the principles underlying 
class actions and public interest actions should be introduced by an Act of Parliament and the 
necessary procedures by rules of court.”310 In practice, the SCA in the Bread Case stated that in 
determining a procedure for class actions, policy issues may arise which is for the Legislature to 
decide and not the courts.311 The substantive and procedural aspects of a class action enacted 
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through legislation is preferable for South Africa, with the intricacies of the procedure being 
provided for through rules of court as suggested by the SA Law Commission. In this way there 
will be one codified approach that can be used by courts faced with class actions, ensuring 
uniformity and certainty. 
 
8.1.2 A CERTIFICATION PROCESS 
The benefits and importance of the certification process have been mentioned above along with a 
discussion of the Australian regime where this process has not been adopted. Despite the time 
consuming nature of this process, a certification process is followed in the American and 
Canadian foreign jurisdictions. Hurter has referred to the certification process as being the most 
important feature of class action litigation.312 The Trial Court decision in the case of Ngxuza 
distinctly acknowledged a certification process by stating that “the possibility of unjustified 
litigation can be curtailed by making it a procedural requirement that leave must be sought from 
the High Court to proceed on a representative basis prior to actually embarking on that road.” 
The SA Law Commission recommended same in its Report and went on to expressly define the 
word “certify” in its Draft Bill.313 
In the case of Mukaddam the CC held that there was no need for a certification process where a 
class action was sought to enforce a claim against the State where a right in the Bill of Rights has 
been infringed or threatened. In agreeing with Mhlantla AJ,314 it is my submission that 
certification would be beneficial in these circumstances as it is imperative in guiding class 
litigation. Section 38(c) of the Constitution guarantees a class action to individuals in certain 
circumstances and therefore there is no need to satisfy the requirements of certification to be able 
to institute a class action in cases involving a right in the Bill of Rights. However, the 
certification process should be used purely as a procedural tool in ensuring that the class 
litigation runs smoothly and efficiently. 
It is therefore proposed that certification proceedings, as stated in the Ngxuza Trial Court 
decision, form part of the class action litigation process in matters involving a right in the Bill of 
Rights and in matters involving a non-constitutional right. 
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8.1.3 THE CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS 
According to the South African National Consumer Council, the criteria for certification should 
be defined as broadly as possible in order to facilitate access to justice.315  
As stated above, there are many similarities between the certification requirements laid down in 
South African case law, the foreign jurisdictions and the SA Law Commission Report’s Draft 
Bill316 on class actions. This Bill lists the requirements of certification as follows: 
“In deciding to certify an action as a class action, the court may take into account - 
(a) evidence of the existence of an identifiable class of persons; 
(b) the existence of a prima facie cause of action; 
(c) issues of fact or law which are common to the claims or defences of individual members of a 
class; 
(d) the availability of a suitable representative or representatives to represent the interests of the 
members of the class; 
(e) the interests of justice; and 
(f) whether, having regard to all relevant circumstances, a class action would be the appropriate 
method of proceeding with the action.” 317 
As found in the foreign jurisdictions, the SA Law Commission Report correctly recommends that 
an action no longer proceed as a class action if any of the criteria for certification that was 
originally met, is no longer fulfilled.318 This prevents the litigation from becoming unmanageable 
in the future. 
 
(a) Identifiable class of persons 
The mentioned foreign jurisdictions have differing versions of the numerosity requirement. In 
debating the approaches adopted by the foreign jurisdictions, the SA Law Commission 
acknowledges that “the precise number of the litigants is not necessarily directly related to the 
complexity of the litigation and whether it deserves a special procedure.”319 This negates the 
Ontario and Australian approaches. The Commission then acknowledges the impracticability of 
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joinder test as required under the American regime but does not formulate a test exactly like it. 
The Commission instead asks the court to determine whether there are so many potential litigants 
that suing together in terms of ordinary civil procedure would be impracticable.320 This approach 
is preferable and proposed as it allows for flexibility in not providing for a specific number of 
litigants or restricting the numerosity determination to that of joinder being impracticable. It 
essentially allows for the impracticability to be considered as one of the factors and not the only 
factor in determining the numerosity requirement. Given the SA Law Commission’s 
recommendation of supplementing proposed class action legislation with rules of court, 
guidelines should be provided to enable the court to establish whether the factors determining 
numerosity requirement have been met.  
(b) Prima facie cause of action 
The SA Law Commission and the Ontario CPA specifically require that the pleadings disclose a 
cause of action while the American and Australian regimes do not list this as a requirement for 
certification. This often involves the question of whether a preliminary test of the merits of the 
case should occur at this stage. Mulheron submits that none of these foreign jurisdictions 
expressly permits the consideration of the merits of the claim at certification proceedings.321 
However, in satisfying the other requirements for certification in the foreign jurisdictions as well 
in Australia where there is no certification process, an assessment of the merits does occur, albeit 
at a superficial level. It is therefore proposed that at the stage of certification the only question 
that is to be answered is whether the claim(s) of the potential class members will be able to be 
pursued through class litigation. The success of the litigation should not be a consideration at this 
stage and a consideration of the merits and evidence in support of it should only occur with 
reference to question of whether the claims are “legally plausible” as stated by the SCA in the 
Bread Case.322 
(c) Common issues of fact or law 
Common issues of law or fact form the foundation of a class action and this requirement is 
therefore of utmost importance. The foreign jurisdictions have recognized this and have included 
this requirement in their class action legislation. The American class action regime requires the 
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common issues to ‘predominate’ over the individual issues. As previously stated this 
predominance requirement is not provided under the Ontario class action regime and the 
Australian regime includes it in an indirect manner. Despite the advantages of including 
predominance as a stand-alone requirement, the SA Law Commission does not suggest it citing 
access to justice as its reason for doing so. However, it is proposed that due to the advantages of 
the predominance requirement highlighted in the discussion of the American class action regime 
above, this requirement should either be included in class action legislation as a stand-alone 
requirement or in the court rules as a factor that must be taken into consideration when dealing 
with the requirement of commonality. In this way the predominance of the common issues are 
taken into account in any event. 
(d) Suitable representative  
The different pieces of legislation in the abovementioned foreign jurisdictions state that adequate 
representation of the absent class members is required by the representative litigant. The SA Law 
Commission Report states that the representative should be suitable and adequately represent 
absent class members with the required financial resources to pursue the litigation in the absence 
of a conflict of interest.323 It also states that the court must be satisfied that a bona fide class 
action is being brought before appointing the representative.324 This was the approach of the 
SCA in the Bread Case, where various factors gauging the suitability of the representative were 
mentioned.325 
Hurter submits that the word ‘suitability’ in the Draft Bill of the SA Law Commission Report 
should be replaced by the word ‘adequately’ in order to avoid any redundancy of the 
legislation.326 This would also bring the proposed South African legislation in line with that of 
the foreign jurisdictions discussed. 
It is submitted that Hurter proposes a noteworthy change to the Draft Bill and in implementing 
her suggestion the Legislature would avoid the unintended ambiguity that now exists in the 
section. Also, the factors listed by the SCA in the Bread Case and the SA Law Commission 
Report should be included in the class action legislation and guidelines as to how to assess these 
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factors should be made available in the rules of court. This will serve as a guideline to judges in 
giving procedural effect to the substantive law. 
In assessing the suitability or adequacy of the representative, the court should also take 
cognizance of the fee agreement between the lawyer and the class members. The awards made in 
class actions are usually very large with the lawyer, who is usually the class representative, 
taking a percentage of these awards towards his legal fees. Therefore the court must be especially 
aware of fee agreements that reflect that the lawyer is to receive a large sum of money in fees 
which may be most of the class award. 
In acknowledging that “a large percentage of the South African population is unsophisticated, 
poorly educated and indigent and therefore unable to enforce their rights on their own…that it is 
not an answer to the problem to allow somebody, regardless of the wishes of the group of 
unsophisticated and poorly educated litigants, to proceed with an action on behalf of such a 
group,” both the SA Law Commission and the SCA in the Bread Case cited the ideological 
plaintiff concept with approval.327 This removes the need for the requirement of ‘typicality’ 
found under the American class action regime, as the representative plaintiff need not even have 
a claim against the defendants in order to represent the absent class members. 
It is therefore proposed that the concept of the ideological plaintiff be adopted into South African 
class action legislation as it is the concept best suited to the reparation of historical injustices 
suffered in the county. By allowing consumer and legal aid organisations to represent individuals 
who are unable to represent themselves in obtaining redress, a contribution is made to the 
principle of access to justice. The courts should also be obliged to take into account fee 
agreements between the members and the class representative or lawyer, in deciding whether a 
class action should proceed. 
(e) The interests of justice 
The SA Law Commission Reports lists the interests of justice as a stand-alone requirement in the 
certification process. The CC in Mukaddam stated that the interest of justice is the standard that 
is to be applied when considering certification applications.328 As previously stated, one could 
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conclude that the manner in which the court phrased this test indicates an intention for this 
requirement to be an overriding requirement.  
The question that needs to be answered base on the CC judgment is whether class actions in 
South Africa should proceed on vague concepts like the interests of justice, or should they 
proceed on carefully considered rules that are put into place to ensure that class actions are 
brought only in carefully considered circumstances? On the other hand, should the approach be 
that a class action should be brought even if all the requirements laid down in the Bread Case are 
met but it is not in the interests of justice to bring such an action? 
It is submitted that instead of a specific stand-alone requirement, the interest of justice should be 
an overarching requirement of the certification process. The reasoning is that the interests of 
justice should be a goal that courts should strive to attain when any claim is brought, by way of a 
class action or not. It links closely to the concept of access to justice and is therefore considered 
to be a pillar of the South African justice system. It is suggested that the interests of justice need 
not be a stand-alone requirement for certification and should instead be included in section 6(1) 
of the Draft Bill. The section should then read “No action shall proceed as a class action unless 
the court has certified the action as a class action to be commenced in the interests of justice.” 
The requirements of certification laid down in the Bread Case should therefore be met along with 
the consideration of whether it is in the interests of justice to bring such an action. 
(f) An appropriate procedure 
Amongst the foreign jurisdictions the class action is either required to be the superior method of 
adjudication or the preferred method of adjudication. Requiring a preferred method over a 
superior method increases access to justice as this is an easier standard to meet. The SA Law 
Commission Report goes further in promoting access to justice by merely requiring the class 
action to be an appropriate procedure to pursue the claims. This proposal seems to be an 
acceptable one. However, it is proposed that like some of the foreign jurisdictions, clear factors 
need to be laid down in legislation under this requirement to guide the representative litigant in 
making its case. Guidelines laid down in the court rules under each factor will also prove helpful 




(g) Class definition 
First, the definition section of the Draft Bill does not define the word ‘class.’ It is proposed that 
some definition, even if broadly stated, be given to this word. A proposed definition of a class 
that can be adopted and that is adapted from the Draft Bill’s definition of a class action is 
“persons claiming relief arising from substantially similar issues.” 
 
Secondly, as stated in the Trial Court decision of Ngxuza and later affirmed in the Appeal Court 
decision of the same case, specific details regarding the identities of the class members is not 
required. In the CC case of Mukaddam the court confirmed the same reasoning in the Bread 
Case.329 This position is recommended as it should never be that certification is refused due to 
the identity of − sometimes hundreds of thousands − individuals not being ascertained. 
 
Thirdly, all of the foreign jurisdictions make provision for sub-classes. Section 6(5) of the Draft 
Bill states as follows: 
 
“The court shall not be precluded from certifying an action as a class action merely by reason of 
the fact that there are issues pertaining to the claims of all or some of the members of the class 
which will require individual determination, or that different class members seek different relief.” 
 
It is proposed that the draft legislation be amended to provide expressly for the use of sub-classes 
to allow the court to deal with individual issues or issues that are only common to a certain 
numbers of the class. 
 
(h) Notice to the class 
The opt-out model model of notice has been favoured in both the foreign jurisdictions and in the 
South African courts.330 Although the opt in model has its advantages, the Ontario regime shuns 
it in its entirety. Legislation in each of the foreign jurisdictions dictate which model is to be used, 
when notice is to be given, to whom notice is to be given and what the notice is to contain. The 
Draft Bill leaves it to the courts to decide on notice requirements by stating as follows: 
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330 In the Ngxuza trial court decision and in the Bread Case the opt out model of notice was sought to be used. 
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“The court which certifies an action as a class action may give directions to the representative 
with regard to - 
(a) the giving of notice of the action to the members or potential members of the class concerned; 
(b) the form which such notice should take; 
(c) the way in which such notice is to be communicated to the members of the class.”331 
In section 8(3) of the Draft Bill in the SA Law Commission Report, the options of the opt out 
notice, the opt in or no notice at all is given to the court. This approach allows for flexibility in 
certifying a class action. Not only are judges able to exercise their discretion with regard to the 
unique facts of each case but they are also able to actively avoid problems encountered in the 
foreign jurisdictions where a specific type of notice is prescribed. The list factors listed in the 
Draft Bill is not a closed list and judges are able to regard any other factor they think relevant to 
the certification enquiry.332  
 
The main objective of this requirement is that class, or potential members of the class, are to be 
notified of the progression of the class action. Due process is required. It is recommended that 
the types of notice and the mediums through which notice can be given be highlighted in the 
court rules as this is not provided for in the Draft Bill. For example, if a class is relatively small a 
judge can be guided into ordering that individual notice be given. Whereas if the class is 
relatively large notice can be given via electronic means such as radio, television, posters or 
publication in a newspaper circulated in the relevant area. The instances when notice is most 
important, for example at the commencement of certification proceedings and when settlement is 
reached, should also be mentioned. The content requirements of the different notices should also 
be made available to the judges in the court rules. Flexibility should be at the forefront of this 
consideration. Guidelines in the court rules assisting the court in determining the factors 
highlighted in section 8(2) of the Draft Bill would also prevent inconsistency among judgments. 
The SA Law Commission Report proposes that the legislation provide for this detail.333 
However, it is submitted that in order to prevent proposed legislation from becoming long and 
convoluted, such detail should instead be covered in the court rules. 
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72 
 
(i) Settlement of a class action 
Court approval of settlements and notice of a proposed settlement to class members seems to be 
the rule of thumb in the foreign jurisdictions. It is therefore no surprise that the SA Law 
Commission Report recommends the same approach. This approach is recommended as it gives 
effect to the interests of the absent class members. A representative litigant is unable to settle a 
class action on his own terms for his own benefit only. Through notice given about a proposed 
settlement, the class members are able to object to terms and conditions of the settlement and the 
court will be able to carefully consider these objections. It is pertinent and thus recommended; 
that factors be listed in proposed legislation to enable the court to determine if a settlement is 
unjust and therefore improper. Such factors factor should be, inter alia, if the settlement is 
excessively one-sided or if there has been any collusion between the parties. 
 
(j) Monetary relief 
The ultimate goal of the class members is to obtain redress, most commonly in the form of 
monetary relief, for the damages they each suffered. At this stage of the class action, the focus 
diverts from arguments in courtroom to the formation of the best practical method of actually 
providing compensation to the absent class members.  
 
In the mentioned foreign jurisdictions the assessment of awards and the distributing of 
compensation can occur in many different ways. South Africa has restricted itself to making 
awards through individual or aggregate assessments and the court is ultimate decision-maker of 
which is the most appropriate assessment in the circumstances.334 This is in line with what is 
stated in section 76(1)(c) of the Consumer Protection Act: 
 
“a court can award damages against a supplier for collective injury to all or a class of consumers 
generally, to be paid on any conditions that the court considers just and equitable to achieve the 
purpose of the Act.” 
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In practice, the court has also been inclined to reject the cy pres method of distribution and 
favoured an award being made on aggregate basis through the use of statistical formulae.335 
Money should replace money lost. The courts have refused to take it upon themselves to 
determine what would be a suitable replacement for money in the class members’ hands. It is 
submitted that although this is an admirable approach, the alternate methods of distribution like 
the cy pres and coupon methods should not be disregarded entirely. There may be instances 
where the class is so large that actual monetary distribution becomes burdensome with the result 
that the total sum of the award is not effectively distributed. The alternate methods of distribution 
may then just be the solution to these problems, even for a limited period of time. 
 
It is therefore proposed that the draft legislation make provision for these alternate methods of 
distribution and that the court rules contain guidelines as to when it would be most appropriate 


















                                                          





The inclusion of a collective redress provision in the Consumer Protection Act has opened the 
doors to class litigation for consumers in South Africa. It is now easy to envisage a situation 
where South African courts will inevitably be faced with its own version of a ‘Lance Armstrong’ 
class action. Although a welcomed development, if we were to be faced with a claim like this at 
present, our courts would still be making their way through the dark, hoping for a light at the end 
of the tunnel which would hopefully come in the form of class action procedure legislation. This 
is because since the SA Law Commission’s Report in 1998, there has been no promulgation of 
any class action procedure legislation or guidelines in line with the Commission’s 
recommendations. This has not come without consequence. 
 
The Trial Court decision and the Appeal Court decision of the Ngxuza case together with the 
Bread Case and the case of Mukaddam, were groundbreaking decisions that contributed to the 
development of class action law in South Africa. These cases laid down important procedural 
requirements of the certification process that coincide with the requirements initially laid down 
by the SA Law Commission in its Report. However, one is inclined to consider what the position 
would have been had a procedural framework been in place to guide the judges who adjudicated 
over these matters in the lower courts. A great saving in court time and resources would no doubt 
have occurred.  
 
Although appreciative of the positive impact of these cases on class action development, they 
serve as a clear indication of the inconsistencies of judge made procedural law. The judges in 
these cases drew only on a combination of class action legislation of the mentioned foreign 
jurisdictions and the recommendations of the SA Law Commission Report. This is not sufficient 
and therefore should not be accepted as an adequate method of adjudication. Drawing on the 
positive aspects of the foreign jurisdictions’ legislation and combatting the negative effects of 
their class action procedures is recommended. However, a blind adoption of foreign legislation 
does not do justice to consumers who are differently situated in comparison to those consumers 
in the foreign jurisdictions. A procedure that is tailor-made to suit the past and current social, 
political and historical context of South Africa is one that should be adopted. 
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The certification process is an integral part of a class action. It serves as a road map to both 
judges and class representatives is assessing the direction and progress of the action. It is also 
fundamental in ensuring that the rights of the absent class members are considered at each stage 
of the litigation and provides certain checks and balances through its requirements to avoid an 
abuse of the class action procedure. 
 
The proposed class action procedure is a combination of what has been laid down in the foreign 
jurisdictions as well as the in the SA Law Commission Report and in South African case law. 
The recommendation that a procedure be enacted through legislation and court rules is line with 
the foreign jurisdictions and will go a long way in ensuring consistency and uniformity in class 
action adjudication. The proposed procedure is by no means perfect but it is a procedure that 
takes into account a comparative perspective of procedures that have been successfully 
implemented in foreign jurisdictions. This comparison serves as a basis for informed discussions 
on class actions. 
 
The Preamble of the Consumer Protection Act states that one of the purposes of the Act is to 
“facilitate the freedom of consumers to associate and form groups to advocate and promote their 
common interests.” Section 3(1)(h) of the Act then goes onto state that another purpose of the 
Act is to provide for “an accessible, consistent, harmonised, effective and efficient system of 
redress for consumers.” This coincided perfectly with the provision for class actions that is made 
in section 4(1)(c) of the Act. However, the Act makes no mention of a certification process.   
 
In order to truly give effect to these sections, the first step that must be taken is to enact 
legislation that caters for an appropriate class action procedure. Once this is done, the frequency 
of class actions in courts will lead to further development and amendment of the certification and 
post-certification procedure, resulting in greater access to justice for vulnerable consumers. One 
can only hope that through this practice, class action procedure in South Africa will eventually 
ensure that the aim of the CPA to provide relief for vulnerable consumers, who on their own 





APPENDIX – LEGISLATION 
The United States of America: Rule 23, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
(a) Prerequisites. 
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all 
members only if: 
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, 
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, 
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the 
class; and 
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. 
(b) Types of Class Actions. 
A class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied and if: 
(1) prosecuting separate actions by or against individual class members would create a risk of: 
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members that would 
establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class; or 
(B) adjudications with respect to individual class members that, as a practical matter, would be 
dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the individual adjudications or 
would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; 
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the 
class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting 
the class as a whole; or 
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over 
any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other 
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available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. The matters pertinent to 
these findings include: 
(A) the class members' interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate 
actions; 
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or 
against class members; 
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular 
forum; and 
(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action. 
(c) Certification Order; Notice to Class Members; Judgment; Issues Classes; Subclasses. 
(1) Certification Order. 
(A) Time to Issue. At an early practicable time after a person sues or is sued as a class 
representative, the court must determine by order whether to certify the action as a class action. 
(B) Defining the Class; Appointing Class Counsel. An order that certifies a class action must 
define the class and the class claims, issues, or defenses, and must appoint class counsel under 
Rule 23(g). 
(C) Altering or Amending the Order. An order that grants or denies class certification may be 
altered or amended before final judgment. 
(2) Notice. 
(A) For (b)(1) or (b)(2) Classes. For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2), the court 
may direct appropriate notice to the class. 
(B) For (b)(3) Classes. For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the court must direct to class 
members the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice 
to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort. The notice must clearly and 
concisely state in plain, easily understood language: 
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(i) the nature of the action; 
(ii) the definition of the class certified; 
(iii) the class claims, issues, or defenses; 
(iv) that a class member may enter an appearance through an attorney if the member so desires; 
(v) that the court will exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion; 
(vi) the time and manner for requesting exclusion; and 
(vii) the binding effect of a class judgment on members under Rule 23(c)(3). 
(3) Judgment. 
Whether or not favorable to the class, the judgment in a class action must: 
(A) for any class certified under Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2), include and describe those whom the 
court finds to be class members; and 
(B) for any class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), include and specify or describe those to whom 
the Rule 23(c)(2) notice was directed, who have not requested exclusion, and whom the court 
finds to be class members. 
(4) Particular Issues. 
When appropriate, an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with respect to 
particular issues. 
(5) Subclasses. 
When appropriate, a class may be divided into subclasses that are each treated as a class under 
this rule. 
(d) Conducting the Action. 
(1) In General. 
In conducting an action under this rule, the court may issue orders that: 
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(A) determine the course of proceedings or prescribe measures to prevent undue repetition or 
complication in presenting evidence or argument; 
(B) require — to protect class members and fairly conduct the action — giving appropriate 
notice to some or all class members of: 
(i) any step in the action; 
(ii) the proposed extent of the judgment; or 
(iii) the members' opportunity to signify whether they consider the representation fair and 
adequate, to intervene and present claims or defenses, or to otherwise come into the action; 
(C) impose conditions on the representative parties or on intervenors; 
(D) require that the pleadings be amended to eliminate allegations about representation of absent 
persons and that the action proceed accordingly; or 
(E) deal with similar procedural matters. 
(2) Combining and Amending Orders. 
An order under Rule 23(d)(1) may be altered or amended from time to time and may be 
combined with an order under Rule 16. 
(e) Settlement, Voluntary Dismissal, or Compromise. 
The claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class may be settled, voluntarily dismissed, or 
compromised only with the court's approval. The following procedures apply to a proposed 
settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise: 
(1) The court must direct notice in a reasonable manner to all class members who would be 
bound by the proposal. 
(2) If the proposal would bind class members, the court may approve it only after a hearing and 
on finding that it is fair, reasonable, and adequate. 
80 
 
(3) The parties seeking approval must file a statement identifying any agreement made in 
connection with the proposal. 
(4) If the class action was previously certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the court may refuse to 
approve a settlement unless it affords a new opportunity to request exclusion to individual class 
members who had an earlier opportunity to request exclusion but did not do so. 
(5) Any class member may object to the proposal if it requires court approval under this 
subdivision (e); the objection may be withdrawn only with the court's approval. 
(f) Appeals. 
A court of appeals may permit an appeal from an order granting or denying class-action 
certification under this rule if a petition for permission to appeal is filed with the circuit clerk 
within 14 days after the order is entered. An appeal does not stay proceedings in the district court 
unless the district judge or the court of appeals so orders. 
(g) Class Counsel. 
(1) Appointing Class Counsel. 
Unless a statute provides otherwise, a court that certifies a class must appoint class counsel. In 
appointing class counsel, the court: 
(A) must consider: 
(i) the work counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential claims in the action; 
(ii) counsel's experience in handling class actions, other complex litigation, and the types of 
claims asserted in the action; 
(iii) counsel's knowledge of the applicable law; and 
(iv) the resources that counsel will commit to representing the class; 
(B) may consider any other matter pertinent to counsel's ability to fairly and adequately represent 
the interests of the class; 
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(C) may order potential class counsel to provide information on any subject pertinent to the 
appointment and to propose terms for attorney's fees and nontaxable costs; 
(D) may include in the appointing order provisions about the award of attorney's fees or 
nontaxable costs under Rule 23(h); and 
(E) may make further orders in connection with the appointment. 
(2) Standard for Appointing Class Counsel. 
When one applicant seeks appointment as class counsel, the court may appoint that applicant 
only if the applicant is adequate under Rule 23(g)(1) and (4). If more than one adequate applicant 
seeks appointment, the court must appoint the applicant best able to represent the interests of the 
class. 
(3) Interim Counsel. 
The court may designate interim counsel to act on behalf of a putative class before determining 
whether to certify the action as a class action. 
(4) Duty of Class Counsel. 
Class counsel must fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class. 
(h) Attorney’s Fees and Nontaxable Costs. 
In a certified class action, the court may award reasonable attorney's fees and nontaxable costs 
that are authorized by law or by the parties' agreement. The following procedures apply: 
(1) A claim for an award must be made by motion under Rule 54(d)(2), subject to the provisions 
of this subdivision (h), at a time the court sets. Notice of the motion must be served on all parties 
and, for motions by class counsel, directed to class members in a reasonable manner. 
(2) A class member, or a party from whom payment is sought, may object to the motion. 
(3) The court may hold a hearing and must find the facts and state its legal conclusions 
under Rule 52(a). 
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(4) The court may refer issues related to the amount of the award to a special master or a 























The Canadian Province of Ontario: Class Proceedings Act, 1992, SO 1992 c6 
 
Definitions 
1.  In this Act, 
“common issues” means, 
(a) common but not necessarily identical issues of fact, or 
(b) common but not necessarily identical issues of law that arise from common but not 
necessarily identical facts; (“questions communes”) 
“court” means the Superior Court of Justice but does not include the Small Claims Court; 
(“tribunal”) 
“defendant” includes a respondent; (“défendeur”) 
“plaintiff” includes an applicant. (“demandeur”)  
Plaintiff’s class proceeding 
2.  (1)  One or more members of a class of persons may commence a proceeding in the court on 
behalf of the members of the class.  
Motion for certification 
(2)  A person who commences a proceeding under subsection (1) shall make a motion to a judge 
of the court for an order certifying the proceeding as a class proceeding and appointing the 
person representative plaintiff.  
(3)  A motion under subsection (2) shall be made, 
(a) within ninety days after the later of, 
(i) the date on which the last statement of defence, notice of intent to defend or 
notice of appearance is delivered, and 
(ii) the date on which the time prescribed by the rules of court for delivery of the 
last statement of defence, notice of intent to defend or a notice of appearance 
expires without its being delivered; or 
(b) subsequently, with leave of the court.  
84 
 
Defendant’s class proceeding 
3.  A defendant to two or more proceedings may, at any stage of one of the proceedings, make a 
motion to a judge of the court for an order certifying the proceedings as a class proceeding and 
appointing a representative plaintiff.  
Classing defendants 
4.  Any party to a proceeding against two or more defendants may, at any stage of the 
proceeding, make a motion to a judge of the court for an order certifying the proceeding as a 
class proceeding and appointing a representative defendant.  
Certification 
5.  (1)  The court shall certify a class proceeding on a motion under section 2, 3 or 4 if, 
(a) the pleadings or the notice of application discloses a cause of action; 
(b) there is an identifiable class of two or more persons that would be represented by the 
representative plaintiff or defendant; 
(c) the claims or defences of the class members raise common issues; 
(d) a class proceeding would be the preferable procedure for the resolution of the 
common issues; and 
(e) there is a representative plaintiff or defendant who, 
(i) would fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class, 
(ii) has produced a plan for the proceeding that sets out a workable method of 
advancing the proceeding on behalf of the class and of notifying class members 
of the proceeding, and 
(iii) does not have, on the common issues for the class, an interest in conflict with 
the interests of other class members.  
(2)  Despite subsection (1), where a class includes a subclass whose members have claims or    
defences that raise common issues not shared by all the class members, so that, in the opinion of 
the court, the protection of the interests of the subclass members requires that they be separately 
represented, the court shall not certify the class proceeding unless there is a representative 
plaintiff or defendant who, 
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(a) would fairly and adequately represent the interests of the subclass; 
(b) has produced a plan for the proceeding that sets out a workable method of advancing 
the proceeding on behalf of the subclass and of notifying subclass members of the 
proceeding; and 
(c) does not have, on the common issues for the subclass, an interest in conflict with the 
interests of other subclass members.  
(3)  Each party to a motion for certification shall, in an affidavit filed for use on the motion, 
provide the party’s best information on the number of members in the class. 
(4)  The court may adjourn the motion for certification to permit the parties to amend their 
materials or pleadings or to permit further evidence.  
(5)  An order certifying a class proceeding is not a determination of the merits of the proceeding.  
Certain matters not bar to certification 
6.  The court shall not refuse to certify a proceeding as a class proceeding solely on any of the 
following grounds: 
1. The relief claimed includes a claim for damages that would require individual 
assessment after determination of the common issues. 
2. The relief claimed relates to separate contracts involving different class members. 
3. Different remedies are sought for different class members. 
4. The number of class members or the identity of each class member is not known. 
5. The class includes a subclass whose members have claims or defences that raise 
common issues not shared by all class members.  
Refusal to certify: proceeding may continue in altered form 
7.  Where the court refuses to certify a proceeding as a class proceeding, the court may permit 
the proceeding to continue as one or more proceedings between different parties and, for the 
purpose, the court may, 
(a) order the addition, deletion or substitution of parties; 
(b) order the amendment of the pleadings or notice of application; and 
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(c) make any further order that it considers appropriate.  
Contents of certification order 
8.  (1)  An order certifying a proceeding as a class proceeding shall, 
(a) describe the class; 
(b) state the names of the representative parties; 
(c) state the nature of the claims or defences asserted on behalf of the class; 
(d) state the relief sought by or from the class; 
(e) set out the common issues for the class; and 
(f) specify the manner in which class members may opt out of the class proceeding and a 
date after which class members may not opt out.  
(2)  Where a class includes a subclass whose members have claims or defences that raise 
common issues not shared by all the class members, so that, in the opinion of the court, the 
protection of the interests of the subclass members requires that they be separately represented, 
subsection (1) applies with necessary modifications in respect of the subclass.  
(3)  The court, on the motion of a party or class member, may amend an order certifying a 
proceeding as a class proceeding.  
Opting out 
9.  Any member of a class involved in a class proceeding may opt out of the proceeding in the 
manner and within the time specified in the certification order.  
Where it appears conditions for certification not satisfied 
10.  (1)  On the motion of a party or class member, where it appears to the court that the 
conditions mentioned in subsections 5 (1) and (2) are not satisfied with respect to a class 
proceeding, the court may amend the certification order, may decertify the proceeding or may 
make any other order it considers appropriate.  
(2)  Where the court makes a decertification order under subsection (1), the court may permit the 
proceeding to continue as one or more proceedings between different parties.  
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(3)  For the purposes of subsections (1) and (2), the court has the powers set out in clauses 7 (a) 
to (c).  
Stages of class proceedings 
11.  (1)  Subject to section 12, in a class proceeding, 
(a) common issues for a class shall be determined together; 
(b) common issues for a subclass shall be determined together; and 
(c) individual issues that require the participation of individual class members shall be 
determined individually in accordance with sections 24 and 25.  
(2)  The court may give judgment in respect of the common issues and separate 
judgments in respect of any other issue.  
Court may determine conduct of proceeding 
12.  The court, on the motion of a party or class member, may make any order it considers 
appropriate respecting the conduct of a class proceeding to ensure its fair and expeditious 
determination and, for the purpose, may impose such terms on the parties as it considers 
appropriate.  
Court may stay any other proceeding 
13.  The court, on its own initiative or on the motion of a party or class member, may stay any 
proceeding related to the class proceeding before it, on such terms as it considers appropriate.  
Participation of class members 
14.  (1)  In order to ensure the fair and adequate representation of the interests of the class or any 
subclass or for any other appropriate reason, the court may, at any time in a class proceeding, 
permit one or more class members to participate in the proceeding.  
(2)  Participation under subsection (1) shall be in whatever manner and on whatever terms, 
including terms as to costs, the court considers appropriate.  
Discovery 
15.  (1)  Parties to a class proceeding have the same rights of discovery under the rules of court 
against one another as they would have in any other proceeding.  
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(2)  After discovery of the representative party, a party may move for discovery under the rules 
of court against other class members.  
(3)  In deciding whether to grant leave to discover other class members, the court shall consider, 
(a) the stage of the class proceeding and the issues to be determined at that stage; 
(b) the presence of subclasses; 
(c) whether the discovery is necessary in view of the claims or defences of the party 
seeking leave; 
(d) the approximate monetary value of individual claims, if any; 
(e) whether discovery would result in oppression or in undue annoyance, burden or 
expense for the class members sought to be discovered; and 
(f) any other matter the court considers relevant.  
(4)  A class member is subject to the same sanctions under the rules of court as a party for failure 
to submit to discovery.  
Examination of class members before a motion or application 
16.  (1)  A party shall not require a class member other than a representative party to be 
examined as a witness before the hearing of a motion or application, except with leave of the 
court.  
(2)  Subsection 15 (3) applies with necessary modifications to a decision whether to grant leave 
under subsection (1).  
Notice of certification 
17.  (1)  Notice of certification of a class proceeding shall be given by the representative party to 
the class members in accordance with this section.  
(2)  The court may dispense with notice if, having regard to the factors set out in subsection (3), 
the court considers it appropriate to do so.  
(3)  The court shall make an order setting out when and by what means notice shall be given 
under this section and in so doing shall have regard to, 
(a) the cost of giving notice; 
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(b) the nature of the relief sought; 
(c) the size of the individual claims of the class members; 
(d) the number of class members; 
(e) the places of residence of class members; and 
(f) any other relevant matter.  
(4)  The court may order that notice be given, 
(a) personally or by mail; 
(b) by posting, advertising, publishing or leafleting; 
(c) by individual notice to a sample group within the class; or 
(d) by any means or combination of means that the court considers appropriate.  
(5)  The court may order that notice be given to different class members by different means.  
(6)  Notice under this section shall, unless the court orders otherwise, 
(a) describe the proceeding, including the names and addresses of the representative 
parties and the relief sought; 
(b) state the manner by which and time within which class members may opt out of the 
proceeding; 
(c) describe the possible financial consequences of the proceeding to class members; 
(d) summarize any agreements between representative parties and their solicitors 
respecting fees and disbursements; 
(e) describe any counterclaim being asserted by or against the class, including the relief 
sought in the counterclaim; 
(f) state that the judgment, whether favourable or not, will bind all class members who do 
not opt out of the proceeding; 
(g) describe the right of any class member to participate in the proceeding; 




(i) give any other information the court considers appropriate.  
(7)  With leave of the court, notice under this section may include a solicitation of contributions 
from class members to assist in paying solicitor’s fees and disbursements.  
Notice where individual participation is required 
18.  (1)  When the court determines common issues in favour of a class and considers that the 
participation of individual class members is required to determine individual issues, the 
representative party shall give notice to those members in accordance with this section.  
(2)  Subsections 17 (3) to (5) apply with necessary modifications to notice given under this 
section.  
(3)  Notice under this section shall, 
(a) state that common issues have been determined in favour of the class; 
(b) state that class members may be entitled to individual relief; 
(c) describe the steps to be taken to establish an individual claim; 
(d) state that failure on the part of a class member to take those steps will result in the 
member not being entitled to assert an individual claim except with leave of the 
court; 
(e) give an address to which class members may direct inquiries about the proceeding; 
and 
(f) give any other information that the court considers appropriate.  
Notice to protect interests of affected persons 
19.  (1)  At any time in a class proceeding, the court may order any party to give such notice as it 
considers necessary to protect the interests of any class member or party or to ensure the fair 
conduct of the proceeding.  
(2)  Subsections 17 (3) to (5) apply with necessary modifications to notice given under this 
section.  
Approval of notice by the court 
20.  A notice under section 17, 18 or 19 shall be approved by the court before it is given.  
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Delivery of notice 
21.  The court may order a party to deliver, by whatever means are available to the party, the 
notice required to be given by another party under section 17, 18 or 19, where that is more 
practical.  
Costs of notice 
22.  (1)  The court may make any order it considers appropriate as to the costs of any notice 
under section 17, 18 or 19, including an order apportioning costs among parties.  
(2)  In making an order under subsection (1), the court may have regard to the different interests 
of a subclass.  
Statistical evidence 
23.  (1)  For the purposes of determining issues relating to the amount or distribution of a 
monetary award under this Act, the court may admit as evidence statistical information that 
would not otherwise be admissible as evidence, including information derived from sampling, if 
the information was compiled in accordance with principles that are generally accepted by 
experts in the field of statistics.  
(2)  A record of statistical information purporting to be prepared or published under the authority 
of the Parliament of Canada or the legislature of any province or territory of Canada may be 
admitted as evidence without proof of its authenticity.  
(3)  Statistical information shall not be admitted as evidence under this section unless the party 
seeking to introduce the information has, 
(a) given reasonable notice of it to the party against whom it is to be used, together with a 
copy of the information; 
(b) complied with subsections (4) and (5); and 
(c) complied with any requirement to produce documents under subsection (7).  
(4)  Notice under this section shall specify the source of any statistical information sought to be 
introduced that, 
(a) was prepared or published under the authority of the Parliament of Canada or the 
legislature of any province or territory of Canada; 
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(b) was derived from market quotations, tabulations, lists, directories or other 
compilations generally used and relied on by members of the public; or 
(c) was derived from reference material generally used and relied on by members of an 
occupational group.  
(5)  Except with respect to information referred to in subsection (4), notice under this section 
shall, 
(a) specify the name and qualifications of each person who supervised the preparation of 
statistical information sought to be introduced; and 
(b) describe any documents prepared or used in the course of preparing the statistical 
information sought to be introduced.  
(6)  A party against whom statistical information is sought to be introduced under this section 
may require, for the purposes of cross-examination, the attendance of any person who supervised 
the preparation of the information.  
(7)  Except with respect to information referred to in subsection (4), a party against whom 
statistical information is sought to be introduced under this section may require the party seeking 
to introduce it to produce for inspection any document that was prepared or used in the course of 
preparing the information, unless the document discloses the identity of persons responding to a 
survey who have not consented in writing to the disclosure.  
Aggregate assessment of monetary relief 
24.  (1)  The court may determine the aggregate or a part of a defendant’s liability to class 
members and give judgment accordingly where, 
(a) monetary relief is claimed on behalf of some or all class members; 
(b) no questions of fact or law other than those relating to the assessment of monetary 
relief remain to be determined in order to establish the amount of the defendant’s 
monetary liability; and 
(c) the aggregate or a part of the defendant’s liability to some or all class members can 
reasonably be determined without proof by individual class members. 
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(2)  The court may order that all or a part of an award under subsection (1) be applied so that 
some or all individual class members share in the award on an average or proportional basis.  
(3)  In deciding whether to make an order under subsection (2), the court shall consider whether 
it would be impractical or inefficient to identify the class members entitled to share in the award 
or to determine the exact shares that should be allocated to individual class members.  
(4)  When the court orders that all or a part of an award under subsection (1) be divided among 
individual class members, the court shall determine whether individual claims need to be made 
to give effect to the order.  
(5)  Where the court determines under subsection (4) that individual claims need to be made, the 
court shall specify procedures for determining the claims.  
(6)  In specifying procedures under subsection (5), the court shall minimize the burden on class 
members and, for the purpose, the court may authorize, 
(a) the use of standardized proof of claim forms; 
(b) the receipt of affidavit or other documentary evidence; and 
(c) the auditing of claims on a sampling or other basis.  
(7)  When specifying procedures under subsection (5), the court shall set a reasonable time 
within which individual class members may make claims under this section.  
(8)  A class member who fails to make a claim within the time set under subsection (7) may not 
later make a claim under this section except with leave of the court.  
(9)  The court may give leave under subsection (8) if it is satisfied that, 
(a) there are apparent grounds for relief; 
(b) the delay was not caused by any fault of the person seeking the relief; and 
(c) the defendant would not suffer substantial prejudice if leave were given.  
(10)  The court may amend a judgment given under subsection (1) to give effect to a claim made 




25.  (1)  When the court determines common issues in favour of a class and considers that the 
participation of individual class members is required to determine individual issues, other than 
those that may be determined under section 24, the court may, 
(a) determine the issues in further hearings presided over by the judge who determined 
the common issues or by another judge of the court; 
(b) appoint one or more persons to conduct a reference under the rules of court and report 
back to the court; and 
(c) with the consent of the parties, direct that the issues be determined in any other 
manner.  
(2)  The court shall give any necessary directions relating to the procedures to be followed in 
conducting hearings, inquiries and determinations under subsection (1), including directions for 
the purpose of achieving procedural conformity.  
(3)  In giving directions under subsection (2), the court shall choose the least expensive and most 
expeditious method of determining the issues that is consistent with justice to class members and 
the parties and, in so doing, the court may, 
(a) dispense with any procedural step that it considers unnecessary; and 
(b) authorize any special procedural steps, including steps relating to discovery, and any 
special rules, including rules relating to admission of evidence and means of proof, 
that it considers appropriate.  
(4)  The court shall set a reasonable time within which individual class members may make 
claims under this section.  
(5)  A class member who fails to make a claim within the time set under subsection (4) may not 
later make a claim under this section except with leave of the court.  
(6)  Subsection 24 (9) applies with necessary modifications to a decision whether to give leave 
under subsection (5).  




26.  (1)  The court may direct any means of distribution of amounts awarded under section 24 or 
25 that it considers appropriate.  
(2)  In giving directions under subsection (1), the court may order that, 
(a) the defendant distribute directly to class members the amount of monetary relief to 
which each class member is entitled by any means authorized by the court, including 
abatement and credit; 
(b) the defendant pay into court or some other appropriate depository the total amount of 
the defendant’s liability to the class until further order of the court; and 
(c) any person other than the defendant distribute directly to class members the amount of 
monetary relief to which each member is entitled by any means authorized by the 
court.  
(3)  In deciding whether to make an order under clause (2) (a), the court shall consider whether 
distribution by the defendant is the most practical way of distributing the award for any reason, 
including the fact that the amount of monetary relief to which each class member is entitled can 
be determined from the records of the defendant.  
(4)  The court may order that all or a part of an award under section 24 that has not been 
distributed within a time set by the court be applied in any manner that may reasonably be 
expected to benefit class members, even though the order does not provide for monetary relief to 
individual class members, if the court is satisfied that a reasonable number of class members who 
would not otherwise receive monetary relief would benefit from the order.  
(5)  The court may make an order under subsection (4) whether or not all class members can be 
identified or all of their shares can be exactly determined.  
(6)  The court may make an order under subsection (4) even if the order would benefit, 
(a) persons who are not class members; or 
(b) persons who may otherwise receive monetary relief as a result of the class proceeding.  
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(7)  The court shall supervise the execution of judgments and the distribution of awards under 
section 24 or 25 and may stay the whole or any part of an execution or distribution for a 
reasonable period on such terms as it considers appropriate.  
(8)  The court may order that an award made under section 24 or 25 be paid, 
(a) in a lump sum, forthwith or within a time set by the court; or 
(b) in instalments, on such terms as the court considers appropriate.  
(9)  The court may order that the costs of distribution of an award under section 24 or 25, 
including the costs of notice associated with the distribution and the fees payable to a person 
administering the distribution, be paid out of the proceeds of the judgment or may make such 
other order as it considers appropriate.  
(10)  Any part of an award for division among individual class members that remains unclaimed 
or otherwise undistributed after a time set by the court shall be returned to the party against 
whom the award was made, without further order of the court.  
Judgment on common issues 
27.  (1)  A judgment on common issues of a class or subclass shall, 
(a) set out the common issues; 
(b) name or describe the class or subclass members; 
(c) state the nature of the claims or defences asserted on behalf of the class or subclass; 
and 
(d) specify the relief granted.  
(2)  A judgment on common issues of a class or subclass does not bind, 
(a) a person who has opted out of the class proceeding; or 
(b) a party to the class proceeding in any subsequent proceeding between the party and a 
person mentioned in clause (a).  
(3)  A judgment on common issues of a class or subclass binds every class member who has not 




(a) are set out in the certification order; 
(b) relate to claims or defences described in the certification order; and 
(c) relate to relief sought by or from the class or subclass as stated in the certification 
order.  
Limitations 
28.  (1)  Subject to subsection (2), any limitation period applicable to a cause of action asserted 
in a class proceeding is suspended in favour of a class member on the commencement of the 
class proceeding and resumes running against the class member when, 
(a) the member opts out of the class proceeding; 
(b) an amendment that has the effect of excluding the member from the class is made to 
the certification order; 
(c) a decertification order is made under section 10; 
(d) the class proceeding is dismissed without an adjudication on the merits; 
(e) the class proceeding is abandoned or discontinued with the approval of the court; or 
(f) the class proceeding is settled with the approval of the court, unless the settlement 
provides otherwise.  
(2)  Where there is a right of appeal in respect of an event described in clauses (1) (a) to (f), the 
limitation period resumes running as soon as the time for appeal has expired without an appeal 
being commenced or as soon as any appeal has been finally disposed of.  
Discontinuance, abandonment and settlement 
29.  (1)  A proceeding commenced under this Act and a proceeding certified as a class 
proceeding under this Act may be discontinued or abandoned only with the approval of the court, 
on such terms as the court considers appropriate.  
(2)  A settlement of a class proceeding is not binding unless approved by the court.  
(3)  A settlement of a class proceeding that is approved by the court binds all class members.  
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(4)  In dismissing a proceeding for delay or in approving a discontinuance, abandonment or 
settlement, the court shall consider whether notice should be given under section 19 and whether 
any notice should include, 
(a) an account of the conduct of the proceeding; 
(b) a statement of the result of the proceeding; and 
(c) a description of any plan for distributing settlement funds.  
Appeals 
30.  (1)  A party may appeal to the Divisional Court from an order refusing to certify a 
proceeding as a class proceeding and from an order decertifying a proceeding.  
(2)  A party may appeal to the Divisional Court from an order certifying a proceeding as a class 
proceeding, with leave of the Superior Court of Justice as provided in the rules of court.  
(3)  A party may appeal to the Court of Appeal from a judgment on common issues and from an 
order under section 24, other than an order that determines individual claims made by class 
members.  
(4)  If a representative party does not appeal or seek leave to appeal as permitted by subsection 
(1) or (2), or if a representative party abandons an appeal under subsection (1) or (2), any class 
member may make a motion to the court for leave to act as the representative party for the 
purposes of the relevant subsection.  
(5)  If a representative party does not appeal as permitted by subsection (3), or if a representative 
party abandons an appeal under subsection (3), any class member may make a motion to the 
Court of Appeal for leave to act as the representative party for the purposes of subsection (3).  
(6)  A class member may appeal to the Divisional Court from an order under section 24 or 25 
determining an individual claim made by the member and awarding more than $3,000 to the 
member.  
(7)  A representative plaintiff may appeal to the Divisional Court from an order under section 24 




(8)  A defendant may appeal to the Divisional Court from an order under section 25 determining 
an individual claim made by a class member and awarding more than $3,000 to the member.  
(9)  With leave of the Superior Court of Justice as provided in the rules of court, a class member 
may appeal to the Divisional Court from an order under section 24 or 25, 
(a) determining an individual claim made by the member and awarding $3,000 or less to 
the member; or 
(b) dismissing an individual claim made by the member for monetary relief. 
(10)  With leave of the Superior Court of Justice as provided in the rules of court, a 
representative plaintiff may appeal to the Divisional Court from an order under section 24, 
(a) determining an individual claim made by a class member and awarding $3,000 or less 
to the member; or 
(b) dismissing an individual claim made by a class member for monetary relief.  
(11)  With leave of the Superior Court of Justice as provided in the rules of court, a defendant 
may appeal to the Divisional Court from an order under section 25, 
(a) determining an individual claim made by a class member and awarding $3,000 or less 
to the member; or 
(b) dismissing an individual claim made by a class member for monetary relief.  
Costs 
31.  (1)  In exercising its discretion with respect to costs under subsection 131 (1) of the Courts 
of Justice Act, the court may consider whether the class proceeding was a test case, raised a 
novel point of law or involved a matter of public interest.  
(2)  Class members, other than the representative party, are not liable for costs except with 
respect to the determination of their own individual claims.  
(3)  Where an individual claim under section 24 or 25 is within the monetary jurisdiction of the 
Small Claims Court where the class proceeding was commenced, costs related to the claim shall 




Fees and disbursements 
32.  (1)  An agreement respecting fees and disbursements between a solicitor and a representative 
party shall be in writing and shall, 
(a) state the terms under which fees and disbursements shall be paid; 
(b) give an estimate of the expected fee, whether contingent on success in the class 
proceeding or not; and 
(c) state the method by which payment is to be made, whether by lump sum, salary or 
otherwise.  
(2)  An agreement respecting fees and disbursements between a solicitor and a representative 
party is not enforceable unless approved by the court, on the motion of the solicitor.  
(3)  Amounts owing under an enforceable agreement are a first charge on any settlement funds or 
monetary award.  
(4)  If an agreement is not approved by the court, the court may, 
(a) determine the amount owing to the solicitor in respect of fees and disbursements; 
(b) direct a reference under the rules of court to determine the amount owing; or 
(c) direct that the amount owing be determined in any other manner.  
Agreements for payment only in the event of success 
33.  (1)  Despite the Solicitors Act and An Act Respecting Champerty, being chapter 327 of 
Revised Statutes of Ontario, 1897, a solicitor and a representative party may enter into a written 
agreement providing for payment of fees and disbursements only in the event of success in a 
class proceeding.  
(2)  For the purpose of subsection (1), success in a class proceeding includes, 
(a) a judgment on common issues in favour of some or all class members; and 
(b) a settlement that benefits one or more class members.  
(3)  For the purposes of subsections (4) to (7), 
“base fee” means the result of multiplying the total number of hours worked by an hourly rate; 
(“honoraires de base”) 
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“multiplier” means a multiple to be applied to a base fee. (“multiplicateur”)  
(4)  An agreement under subsection (1) may permit the solicitor to make a motion to the court to 
have his or her fees increased by a multiplier.  
(5)  A motion under subsection (4) shall be heard by a judge who has, 
(a) given judgment on common issues in favour of some or all class members; or 
(b) approved a settlement that benefits any class member.  
(6)  Where the judge referred to in subsection (5) is unavailable for any reason, the regional 
senior judge shall assign another judge of the court for the purpose.  
(7)  On the motion of a solicitor who has entered into an agreement under subsection (4), the 
court, 
(a) shall determine the amount of the solicitor’s base fee; 
(b) may apply a multiplier to the base fee that results in fair and reasonable compensation 
to the solicitor for the risk incurred in undertaking and continuing the proceeding 
under an agreement for payment only in the event of success; and 
(c) shall determine the amount of disbursements to which the solicitor is entitled, 
including interest calculated on the disbursements incurred, as totalled at the end of 
each six-month period following the date of the agreement.  
(8)  In making a determination under clause (7) (a), the court shall allow only a reasonable fee.  
(9)  In making a determination under clause (7) (b), the court may consider the manner in which 
the solicitor conducted the proceeding.  
Motions 
34.  (1)  The same judge shall hear all motions before the trial of the common issues.  
(2)  Where a judge who has heard motions under subsection (1) becomes unavailable for any 
reason, the regional senior judge shall assign another judge of the court for the purpose.  
(3)  Unless the parties agree otherwise, a judge who hears motions under subsection (1) or (2) 
shall not preside at the trial of the common issues.  
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Rules of court 
35.  The rules of court apply to class proceedings.  
Crown bound 
36.  This Act binds the Crown.  
Application of Act 
37.  This Act does not apply to, 
(a) a proceeding that may be brought in a representative capacity under another Act; 
(b) a proceeding required by law to be brought in a representative capacity; and 
(c) a proceeding commenced before this Act comes into force.  
38.  Omitted (provides for coming into force of provisions of this Act).  


















Australia: Pt. IVA of the Federal Court of Australia Act, 1976 
Division 1—Preliminary 
33A  Interpretation 
In this Part, unless the contrary intention appears: 
group member means a member of a group of persons on whose behalf a representative 
proceeding has been commenced. 
representative party means a person who commences a representative proceeding. 
representative proceeding means a proceeding commenced under section 33C. 
respondent means a person against whom relief is sought in a representative proceeding. 
sub-group member means a person included in a sub-group established under section 33Q. 
sub-group representative party means a person appointed to be a sub-group representative party 
under section 33Q. 
33B  Application 
A proceeding may only be brought under this Part in respect of a cause of action arising after the 
commencement of the Federal Court of Australia Amendment Act 1991. 
Division 2—Commencement of representative proceeding 
33C  Commencement of proceeding 
(1) Subject to this Part, where: 
 (a) 7 or more persons have claims against the same person; and 
 (b) the claims of all those persons are in respect of, or arise out of, the same, similar or 
related circumstances; and 
 (c) the claims of all those persons give rise to a substantial common issue of law or fact; 
a proceeding may be commenced by one or more of those persons as representing some 
or all of them. 
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(2) A representative proceeding may be commenced: 
 (a) whether or not the relief sought: 
  (i) is, or includes, equitable relief; or 
  (ii) consists of, or includes, damages; or 
  (iii) includes claims for damages that would require individual assessment; or 
  (iv) is the same for each person represented; and 
 (b) whether or not the proceeding: 
(i) is concerned with separate contracts or transactions between the respondent in 
the proceeding and individual group members; or 
(ii) involves separate acts or omissions of the respondent done or omitted to be 
done in relation to individual group members. 
33D  Standing 
(1) A person referred to in paragraph 33C(1)(a) who has a sufficient interest to commence a 
proceeding on his or her own behalf against another person has a sufficient interest to commence 
a representative proceeding against that other person on behalf of other persons referred to in that 
paragraph. 
(2) Where a person has commenced a representative proceeding, the person retains a sufficient 
interest: 
 (a) to continue that proceeding; and 
 (b) to bring an appeal from a judgment in that proceeding; 
even though the person ceases to have a claim against the respondent. 
33E  Is consent required to be a group member? 
(1) The consent of a person to be a group member in a representative proceeding is not required 
unless subsection (2) applies to the person. 
(2) None of the following persons is a group member in a representative proceeding unless the 
person gives written consent to being so: 
 (a) the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory; 
 (b) a Minister or a Minister of a State or Territory; 
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(c) a body corporate established for a public purpose by a law of the Commonwealth, of a 
State or of a Territory, other than an incorporated company or association; or 
(d) an officer of the Commonwealth, of a State or of a Territory, in his or her capacity as 
such an officer. 
33F  Persons under disability 
(1) It is not necessary for a person under disability to have a next friend or committee merely in 
order to be a group member. 
(2) A group member who is under disability may only take a step in the representative 
proceeding, or conduct part of the proceeding, by his or her next friend or committee, as the case 
requires. 
33G  Representative proceeding not to be commenced in certain circumstances 
A representative proceeding may not be commenced if the proceeding would be concerned only 
with claims in respect of which the Court has jurisdiction solely by virtue of the Jurisdiction of 
Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 or a corresponding law of a State or Territory. 
33H  Originating process 
(1) An application commencing a representative proceeding, or a document filed in support of 
such an application, must, in addition to any other matters required to be included: 
(a) describe or otherwise identify the group members to whom the proceeding relates; 
and 
(b) specify the nature of the claims made on behalf of the group members and the relief 
claimed; and 
 (c) specify the questions of law or fact common to the claims of the group members. 
(2) In describing or otherwise identifying group members for the purposes of subsection (1), it is 





33J  Right of group member to opt out 
(1) The Court must fix a date before which a group member may opt out of a representative 
proceeding. 
(2) A group member may opt out of the representative proceeding by written notice given under 
the Rules of Court before the date so fixed. 
(3) The Court, on the application of a group member, the representative party or the respondent 
in the proceeding, may fix another date so as to extend the period during which a group member 
may opt out of the representative proceeding. 
(4) Except with the leave of the Court, the hearing of a representative proceeding must not 
commence earlier than the date before which a group member may opt out of the proceeding. 
33K  Causes of action accruing after commencement of representative proceeding 
(1) The Court may at any stage of a representative proceeding, on application made by the 
representative party, give leave to amend the application commencing the representative 
proceeding so as to alter the description of the group. 
(2) The description of the group may be altered so as to include a person: 
(a)whose cause of action accrued after the commencement of the representative 
proceeding but before such date as the Court fixes when giving leave; and 
(b) who would have been included in the group, or, with the consent of the person would 
have been included in the group, if the cause of action had accrued before the 
commencement of the proceeding. 
(3) The date mentioned in paragraph (2)(a) may be the date on which leave is given or another 
date before or after that date. 
(4) Where the Court gives leave under subsection (1), it may also make any other orders it thinks 
just, including an order relating to the giving of notice to persons who, as a result of the 




33L  Situation where fewer than 7 group members 
If, at any stage of a representative proceeding, it appears likely to the Court that there are fewer 
than 7 group members, the Court may, on such conditions (if any) as it thinks fit: 
 (a) order that the proceeding continue under this Part; or 
 (b) order that the proceeding no longer continue under this Part. 
33M  Cost of distributing money etc. excessive 
Where: 
(a) the relief claimed in a representative proceeding is or includes payment of money to 
group members (otherwise than in respect of costs); and 
(b) on application by the respondent, the Court concludes that it is likely that, if judgment 
were to be given in favour of the representative party, the cost to the respondent of 
identifying the group members and distributing to them the amounts ordered to be paid to 
them would be excessive having regard to the likely total of those amounts; 
the Court may, by order: 
 (c) direct that the proceeding no longer continue under this Part; or 
 (d) stay the proceeding so far as it relates to relief of the kind mentioned in paragraph (a). 
33N  Order that proceeding not continue as representative proceeding where costs 
excessive etc. 
(1) The Court may, on application by the respondent or of its own motion, order that a 
proceeding no longer continue under this Part where it is satisfied that it is in the interests of 
justice to do so because: 
(a) the costs that would be incurred if the proceeding were to continue as a representative 
proceeding are likely to exceed the costs that would be incurred if each group member 
conducted a separate proceeding; or 
(b) all the relief sought can be obtained by means of a proceeding other than a 
representative proceeding under this Part; or 
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(c) the representative proceeding will not provide an efficient and effective means of 
dealing with the claims of group members; or 
(d) it is otherwise inappropriate that the claims be pursued by means of a representative 
proceeding. 
(2) If the Court dismisses an application under this section, the Court may order that no further 
application under this section be made by the respondent except with the leave of the Court. 
(3) Leave for the purposes of subsection (2) may be granted subject to such conditions as to costs 
as the Court considers just. 
33P  Consequences of order that proceeding not continue under this Part 
Where the Court makes an order under section 33L, 33M or 33N that a proceeding no longer 
continue under this Part: 
(a) the proceeding may be continued as a proceeding by the representative party on his or 
her own behalf against the respondent; and 
(b) on the application of a person who was a group member for the purposes of the 
proceeding, the Court may order that the person be joined as an applicant in the 
proceeding. 
33Q  Determination of issues where not all issues are common 
(1) If it appears to the Court that determination of the issue or issues common to all group 
members will not finally determine the claims of all group members, the Court may give 
directions in relation to the determination of the remaining issues. 
(2) In the case of issues common to the claims of some only of the group members, the directions 
given by the Court may include directions establishing a sub-group consisting of those group 
members and appointing a person to be the sub-group representative party on behalf of the 
sub-group members. 
(3) Where the Court appoints a person other than the representative party to be a sub-group 
representative party, that person, and not the representative party, is liable for costs associated 
with the determination of the issue or issues common to the sub-group members. 
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33R  Individual issues 
(1) In giving directions under section 33Q, the Court may permit an individual group member to 
appear in the proceeding for the purpose of determining an issue that relates only to the claims of 
that member. 
(2) In such a case, the individual group member, and not the representative party, is liable for 
costs associated with the determination of the issue. 
33S  Directions relating to commencement of further proceedings 
Where an issue cannot properly or conveniently be dealt with under section 33Q or 33R, the 
Court may: 
(a) if the issue concerns only the claim of a particular member—give directions relating 
to the commencement and conduct of a separate proceeding by that member; or 
(b) if the issue is common to the claims of all members of a sub-group—give directions 
relating to the commencement and conduct of a representative proceeding in relation to 
the claims of those members. 
33T  Adequacy of representation 
(1) If, on an application by a group member, it appears to the Court that a representative party is 
not able adequately to represent the interests of the group members, the Court may substitute 
another group member as representative party and may make such other orders as it thinks fit. 
(2) If, on an application by a sub-group member, it appears to the Court that a sub-group 
representative party is not able adequately to represent the interests of the sub-group members, 
the Court may substitute another person as sub-group representative party and may make such 
other orders as it thinks fit. 
33U  Stay of execution in certain circumstances 
Where a respondent in a representative proceeding commences a proceeding in the Court against 
a group member, the Court may order a stay of execution in respect of any relief awarded to the 
group member in the representative proceeding until the other proceeding is determined. 
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33V  Settlement and discontinuance—representative proceeding 
(1) A representative proceeding may not be settled or discontinued without the approval of the 
Court. 
(2) If the Court gives such an approval, it may make such orders as are just with respect to the 
distribution of any money paid under a settlement or paid into the Court. 
33W  Settlement of individual claim of representative party 
(1) A representative party may, with leave of the Court, settle his or her individual claim in 
whole or in part at any stage of the representative proceeding. 
(2) A representative party who is seeking leave to settle, or who has settled, his or her individual 
claim may, with leave of the Court, withdraw as representative party. 
(3) Where a person has sought leave to withdraw as representative party under subsection (2), the 
Court may, on the application of a group member, make an order for the substitution of another 
group member as representative party and may make such other orders as it thinks fit. 
(4) Before granting a person leave to withdraw as a representative party: 
(a) the Court must be satisfied that notice of the application has been given to group 
members in accordance with subsection 33X(1) and in sufficient time for them to apply 
to have another person substituted as the representative party; and 
(b) any application for the substitution of another group member as a representative party 
has been determined. 
(5) The Court may grant leave to a person to withdraw as representative party subject to such 
conditions as to costs as the Court considers just. 
Division 3—Notices 
33X  Notice to be given of certain matters 




(a) the commencement of the proceeding and the right of the group members to opt out of 
the proceeding before a specified date, being the date fixed under subsection 33J(1); 
(b) an application by the respondent in the proceeding for the dismissal of the proceeding 
on the ground of want of prosecution; 
(c) an application by a representative party seeking leave to withdraw under section 33W 
as representative party. 
(2) The Court may dispense with compliance with any or all of the requirements of 
subsection (1) where the relief sought in a proceeding does not include any claim for damages. 
(3) If the Court so orders, notice must be given to group members of the bringing into Court of 
money in answer to a cause of action on which a claim in the representative proceeding is 
founded. 
(4) Unless the Court is satisfied that it is just to do so, an application for approval of a settlement 
under section 33V must not be determined unless notice has been given to group members. 
(5) The Court may, at any stage, order that notice of any matter be given to a group member or 
group members. 
(6) Notice under this section must be given as soon as practicable after the happening of the 
event to which the notice relates. 
33Y  Notices—ancillary provisions 
(1) This section is concerned with notices under section 33X. 
(2) The form and content of a notice must be as approved by the Court. 
(3) The Court must, by order, specify: 
 (a) who is to give the notice; and 
 (b) the way in which the notice is to be given; 
and the order may include provision: 
 (c) directing a party to provide information relevant to the giving of the notice; and 
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 (d) relating to the costs of notice. 
(4) An order under subsection (3) may require that notice be given by means of press 
advertisement, radio or television broadcast, or by any other means. 
(5) The Court may not order that notice be given personally to each group member unless it is 
satisfied that it is reasonably practicable, and not unduly expensive, to do so. 
(6) A notice that concerns a matter for which the Court’s leave or approval is required must 
specify the period within which a group member or other person may apply to the Court, or take 
some other step, in relation to the matter. 
(7) A notice that includes or concerns conditions must specify the conditions and the period, if 
any, for compliance. 
(8) The failure of a group member to receive or respond to a notice does not affect a step taken, 
an order made, or a judgment given, in a proceeding. 
Division 4—Judgment etc. 
33Z  Judgment—powers of the Court 
(1) The Court may, in determining a matter in a representative proceeding, do any one or more of 
the following: 
 (a) determine an issue of law; 
 (b) determine an issue of fact; 
 (c) make a declaration of liability; 
 (d) grant any equitable relief; 
 (e) make an award of damages for group members, sub-group members or individual 
group members, being damages consisting of specified amounts or amounts worked out 
in such manner as the Court specifies; 
(f) award damages in an aggregate amount without specifying amounts awarded in 
respect of individual group members; 
 (g) make such other order as the Court thinks just. 
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(2) In making an order for an award of damages, the Court must make provision for the payment 
or distribution of the money to the group members entitled. 
(3) Subject to section 33V, the Court is not to make an award of damages under paragraph (1)(f) 
unless a reasonably accurate assessment can be made of the total amount to which group 
members will be entitled under the judgment. 
(4) Where the Court has made an order for the award of damages, the Court may give such 
directions (if any) as it thinks just in relation to: 
(a) the manner in which a group member is to establish his or her entitlement to share in 
the damages; and 
(b) the manner in which any dispute regarding the entitlement of a group member to 
share in the damages is to be determined. 
33ZA  Constitution etc. of fund 
(1) Without limiting the operation of subsection 33Z(2), in making provision for the distribution 
of money to group members, the Court may provide for: 
(a) the constitution and administration of a fund consisting of the money to be distributed; 
and 
 (b) either: 
  (i) the payment by the respondent of a fixed sum of money into the fund; or 
  (ii) the payment by the respondent into the fund of such instalments, on such     
terms, as the Court directs to meet the claims of group members; and 
 (c) entitlements to interest earned on the money in the fund. 
(2) The costs of administering a fund are to be borne by the fund, or by the respondent in the 
representative proceeding, as the Court directs. 
(3) Where the Court orders the constitution of a fund mentioned in subsection (1), the order 
must: 




(b) specify the manner in which a group member is to make a claim for payment out of 
the fund and establish his or her entitlement to the payment; and 
(c) specify a day (which is 6 months or more after the day on which the order is made) on 
or before which the group members are to make a claim for payment out of the fund; and 
(d) make provision in relation to the day before which the fund is to be distributed to 
group members who have established an entitlement to be paid out of the fund. 
(4) The Court may allow a group member to make a claim after the day fixed under 
paragraph (3)(c) if: 
 (a) the fund has not already been fully distributed; and 
 (b) it is just to do so. 
(5) On application by the respondent in the representative proceeding after the day fixed under 
paragraph (3)(d), the Court may make such orders as are just for the payment from the fund to 
the respondent of the money remaining in the fund. 
33ZB  Effect of judgment 
A judgment given in a representative proceeding: 
 (a) must describe or otherwise identify the group members who will be affected by it; and 
 (b) binds all such persons other than any person who has opted out of the proceeding  
under section 33J. 
Division 5—Appeals 
33ZC  Appeals to the Court 
(1) The following appeals under Division 2 of Part III from a judgment of the Court in a 
representative proceeding may themselves be brought as representative proceedings: 
(a) an appeal by the representative party on behalf of group members and in respect of the 
judgment to the extent that it relates to issues common to the claims of group members; 
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(b) an appeal by a sub-group representative party on behalf of sub-group members in 
respect of the judgment to the extent that it relates to issues common to the claims of 
sub-group members. 
(2) The parties to an appeal referred to in paragraph (1)(a) are the representative party, as the 
representative of the group members, and the respondent. 
(3) The parties to an appeal referred to in paragraph (1)(b) are the sub-group representative party, 
as the representative of the sub-group members, and the respondent. 
(4) On an appeal by the respondent in a representative proceeding, other than an appeal referred 
to in subsection (5), the parties to the appeal are: 
(a) in the case of an appeal in respect of the judgment generally—the respondent and the 
representative party as the representative of the group members; and 
(b) in the case of an appeal in respect of the judgment to the extent that it relates to issues 
common to the claims of sub-group members—the respondent and the sub-group 
representative party as the representative of the sub-group members. 
(5) The parties to an appeal in respect of the determination of an issue that relates only to a claim 
of an individual group member are that group member and the respondent. 
(6) If the representative party or the sub-group representative party does not bring an appeal 
within the time provided for instituting appeals, another member of the group or sub-group may, 
within a further 21 days, bring an appeal as representing the group members or sub-group 
members, as the case may be. 
(7) Where an appeal is brought from a judgment of the Court in a representative proceeding, the 
Court may direct that notice of the appeal be given to such person or persons, and in such 
manner, as the Court thinks appropriate. 
(8) Section 33J does not apply to an appeal proceeding. 
(9) The notice instituting an appeal in relation to issues that are common to the claims of group 
members or sub-group members must describe or otherwise identify the group members or 
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sub-group members, as the case may be, but need not specify the names or number of those 
members. 
33ZD  Appeals to the High Court—extended operation of sections 33ZC and 33ZF 
(1) Sections 33ZC and 33ZF apply in relation to appeals to the High Court from judgments of the 
Court in representative proceedings in the same way as they apply to appeals to the Court from 
such judgments. 
(2) Nothing in subsection (1) limits the operation of section 33 whether in relation to appeals 
from judgments of the Court in representative proceedings or otherwise. 
Division 6—Miscellaneous 
33ZE  Suspension of limitation periods 
(1) Upon the commencement of a representative proceeding, the running of any limitation period 
that applies to the claim of a group member to which the proceeding relates is suspended. 
(2) The limitation period does not begin to run again unless either the member opts out of the 
proceeding under section 33J or the proceeding, and any appeals arising from the proceeding, are 
determined without finally disposing of the group member’s claim. 
33ZF  General power of Court to make orders 
(1) In any proceeding (including an appeal) conducted under this Part, the Court may, of its own 
motion or on application by a party or a group member, make any order the Court thinks 
appropriate or necessary to ensure that justice is done in the proceeding. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not limit the operation of section 22. 
33ZG  Saving of rights, powers etc. 
Except as otherwise provided by this Part, nothing in this Part affects: 
(a) the commencement or continuance of any action of a representative character 
commenced otherwise than under this Part; or 
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(b) the Court’s powers under provisions other than this Part, for example, its powers 
in relation to a proceeding in which no reasonable cause of action is disclosed or that is 
oppressive, vexatious, frivolous or an abuse of the process of the Court; or 
 (c) the operation of any law relating to: 
  (i) vexatious litigants (however described); or 
  (ii) proceedings of a representative character; or 
  (iii) joinder of parties; or 
  (iv) consolidation of proceedings; or 
  (v) security for costs. 
33ZH  Special provision relating to claims under Part VI of the Competition and Consumer 
Act 2010 etc. 
(1) For the purposes of the following provisions, a group member in a representative proceeding 
is to be taken to be a party to the proceeding: 
 (a) subsection 87(1) of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010; 
 (b) subsection 238(1) of Schedule 2 to that Act, as that subsection applies as a law of the    
Commonwealth. 
(2) An application by a representative party in a representative proceeding under: 
 (a) subsection 87(1A) of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010; or 
 (b) subsection 237(1) of Schedule 2 to that Act, as that subsection applies as a law of the  
Commonwealth; 
is to be taken to be an application by the representative party and all the group members. 
33ZJ  Reimbursement of representative party’s costs 
(1) Where the Court has made an award of damages in a representative proceeding, the 
representative party or a sub-group representative party, or a person who has been such a party, 
may apply to the Court for an order under this section. 
(2) If, on an application under this section, the Court is satisfied that the costs reasonably 
incurred in relation to the representative proceeding by the person making the application are 
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likely to exceed the costs recoverable by the person from the respondent, the Court may order 
that an amount equal to the whole or a part of the excess be paid to that person out of the 
damages awarded. 
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